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Abstract
We analyze implications of market size for market structure in the charity sector. While
a standard model of oligopolistic for-profit competition predicts a positive relation-
ship between market size and firm size, our analogous model of competition between
prosocially motivated charities predicts no such correlation. If charities are biased to-
wards their own provision, a positive association between market size and provider
size can arise. We examine these predictions empirically for six different local charity
markets. Our empirical findings suggest that charities do not solely pursue prosocial
objectives, and that increased competition in the charity sector can lead to rationaliza-
tion in provision.
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Highlights
• We provide novel theoretical results on oligopolistic competition in the charity
sector.
• Non-prosocial bias towards own provision leads to excessive entry.
• Increased competition in larger markets can lead to rationalization of entry and
production choices in the charity sector as it does in the for-profit sector.
• We show evidence of non-prosocial motives for Canadian charities.
1. Introduction
There is growing interest in the question of how to measure performance in the
provision of collective goods (Atkinson, 2005; Simpson, 2009). As the not-for-profit
sector is responsible for providing a sizeable share of collective goods and services and
receives a substantial amount of direct or indirect financial support from government,1
there is also specific interest in the performance of not-for-profit providers and its de-
terminants.2
In this paper, we study how inter-charity competition shapes entry decisions and
market structure in charitable sectors.3 This question is important, because the design
of optimal government policies vis-à-vis the charitable sector is likely to depend on the
answer.
We offer a new model of oligopolistic competition between charities providing hor-
izontally differentiated goods and services, as well as the first empirical analysis of
competitive conduct in different charitable sectors.4 Charities operate in different ar-
eas and have different geographical scope; but they also differ in their precise roles.
Because of this, when evaluating implications of the number of charities competing
within a particular location and charitable activity, one must account for variety effects
as well as technological considerations. In the presence of product differentiation, the
key trade-off driving economic performance is between the fixed costs incurred by
each charitable provider and the additional benefits delivered by the distinctiveness
of that provider’s offering. To date there has been no systematic attempt to derive a
1For example, in the United Kingdom in 2017, the annual gross income from 168,237 charities in
the UK was £75.35 billion, with those charities receiving almost £3.8 billion of tax relief from the UK
government (see www.gov.uk/government/statistics/cost-of-tax-relief); in Canada in 2016, tax
relief for 86,000 registered charities was about CDN$8.5 billion, that is, 67% of the sector’s annual income
of approximately CDN$12.8 billion (see www.canadahelps.org/en/the-giving-report/).
2We use the words charity and not-for-profit here interchangeably as our analysis applies to both
not-for-profits that rely on donations and those that rely on sales for revenue.
3This question has been little studied in the academic literature, which has mostly focused on donors’
choices – for example, on how tax incentives can promote charitable giving (studies include Almunia
et al., 2018; Scharf and Smith, 2015).
4Implications of policy reforms for competition and quality of provision of health services have been
analyzed extensively (e.g., see Propper et al., 2008; Cooper et al., 2011). However, these studies do
not focus on entry (a recent exception being the theoretical analysis of Besley and Malcomson, 2016) or
market structure. Other studies (including Gaynor and Vogt, 2003; Gaynor and Town, 2011; Capps et al.,
2010) have asked if the choice of organizational form affects the pricing decisions of competing hospitals;
but these studies abstract from entry decisions. There is research on the effect of competition on entry
decisions of hospitals, but there are very few contributions looking at other types of private providers of
public goods, which is what we are interested in doing here; a recent exception is Bowblis (2011), who
examines, among other things, the effect of public insurance on closures of for-profit and not-for-profit
nursing homes respectively. One paper that focuses on entry in the broader not-for-profit context is
Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006), but their interest is on the question of selection of organizational form
through entry decisions, and not, as is ours, the implications of market size on market structure in a
not-for-profit context. Two recent related studies are Scharf (2014), which presents a theoretical model
of competition between charities and charity selection; and Perroni et al. (2018), which examines the
effect of coordination on efficient charity selection. The paper by Gaynor and Town (2011) contains a
comprehensive and fairly recent overview of the literature.
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theory of not-for-profit competition under product differentiation that can be directly
compared to and related to analogous models used to study and measure competition
in the for-profit sector.
As a benchmark case, we first model competition between for-profit firms provid-
ing symmetrically differentiated products under conditions of free entry and through
technologies that give rise to economies of scale in production (resulting from a combi-
nation of fixed costs and linear variable costs). To adapt this framework to the not-for-
profit case, we incorporate the key feature that differentiates a for-profit organization
from a not-for-profit organization – namely, charities face a non-distribution constraint.
This requires them to balance revenues and expenses over time “on average”, which
in turn shapes their conduct “on average”, preventing them from pursuing profit max-
imization. In our analysis, we consider both the case where charities’ motivation is
purely prosocial, that is, when their objective is the maximization of social surplus,
and the case where charities are biased towards their own activities and are therefore
also driven by non-prosocial motives (as in Scharf, 2014).
Our model generates the usual predictions for the for-profit sector – both the num-
ber of firms and their average size will increase in market size, as in Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991). Intuitively, under oligopoly firm size is inefficiently low because of exces-
sively high mark-ups; larger markets are more competitive and result in lower mark-
ups, which in turn requires a larger volume of sales to cover fixed costs. An increase in
market size can thus bring firm size closer to its socially optimum size, promoting ra-
tionalization in production. The results for the not-for-profit case when providers are
fully prosocially motivated are strikingly different: an increase in market size raises
the number of providers (proportionally) but has no effect on the size of individual
providers (which always remains equal to its social optimum). In contrast, when not-
for-profit providers are biased towards their own activities, they will be inefficiently
small, since this bias causes over-entry. In this case, an increase in the market size
increases number of providers less than proportionally, and also raises the size of in-
dividual providers, and thus, leads to rationalization in production. However, this
mechanism is different from the one operating in the for-profit case. For not-for-profits,
larger markets already serve more varieties, making it harder for a provider that is
partially driven by prosocial motives to justify adding new varieties at the expense
of a decrease in the scale of provision of existing varieties. The model thus delivers
testable predictions concerning the relationship between market size and average pro-
ducer size, and these predictions are distinctively different depending on providers’
competitive conduct and motives.
We then test empirically whether these predictions hold in panel data for registered
Canadian charities. We study six different charitable sectors providing local goods and
services: food and clothes banks, daycare, housing, senior care, disabled care, and fes-
tivals and performances. We find that market size (defined as population at the mu-
nicipality level) is positively correlated with both average charity size (expenditures
and number of employees) and the number of charities, with the latter increasing less
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than proportionally with market size. Neither of these findings should arise in a set-
ting of not-for-profit competition amongst charities that are purely driven by prosocial
motives; however, they are consistent with a scenario where the charities are biased
towards their own output. The results on charity size are not robust across all speci-
fications, in particular to including market level fixed effects, but further results that
compare the elasticities in the not-for-profit sectors to elasticities in comparable for-
profit sectors provide additional support for the presence of non-prosocial motives, as
does our analysis of the association between competition and fundraising in the data.
Despite the overall pattern of results pointing towards non-prosocial motives, the evi-
dence is not conclusive as it suffers from occasional imprecisions, non-robustness, and
potential endogeneity issues.
Our findings have direct implications for the debate on the effects of government
policies targeted at the charitable sector, a debate that has largely ignored how pub-
lic policies affect inter-charity competition and market performance. Our analytical
framework predicts that, when charities are biased towards their own output, free en-
try can result in charities that are inefficiently small relative to their socially optimal
size. Government intervention may then be warranted to discourage excessive entry,
inducing charities to raise their size and optimally exploit economies of scale. Even in
the absence of government intervention, however, an increase in market size that leads
to increased competition amongst non-profits can be counted on to mitigate inefficient
entry as it does in the for-profit case, but for very different reasons. This also suggests
that there may be a comparatively stronger need for direct corrective measures in not-
for-profit markets that are comparatively small, either because they address a need that
has a comparatively more limited scope or because of the limited geographical reach
of charities’ activities.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate the relationship
between market size and provider size in the not-for-profit sector. The departure from
profit maximization in the context of not-for-profit competition has been investigated
by others; as mentioned, however, that literature has focused mainly on the provision
of education and health services. Here we focus on more broadly defined not-for-
profits. There have been a few contributions studying inter-charity competition, but
these have focused mainly on the implications of organizational form,5 and/or differ-
ential regulatory and tax regimes.6 The mechanics of entry in the not-for-profit sector,
and their implications for market structure in the charitable sector have received scant
attention. This is rather surprising, as it is hard to find another category of economic
activity for which competition would not be at the center of any analysis of economic
performance. In striking contrast, the competitive conduct of firms in the profit sector
and its implications for industry structure have been studied extensively by a long and
established literature.
5See for example, Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Hansmann (1980); Easley and O’Hara (1983); and
Glaeser and Schleifer (2001).
6For example, Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006).
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces a the-
oretical model that compares competition outcomes for for-profit firms and for not-
for-profit providers. Section 3 describes the data, the estimation procedures and the
empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2. Market Size and Market Structure
We describe parallel models of oligopoly competition under conditions of free entry
for the for-profit and the charity sectors. Our aim is to make both of these models as
simple as possible and as comparable as possible, both with respect to each other and
with respect to standard theories of competition between providers.
In our analysis, we take market size (defined in terms of the aggregate value of de-
mand) as exogenous, and model how the equilibrium size and number of providers
vary endogenously with exogenous changes in market size. In this sense, the model
is a partial-equilibrium model that abstracts from endogenous effects on market size
arising from changes that occur in other markets – or, equivalently, as a general equi-
librium model in which the the cross-price elasticity of demand of the good produced
in the market under consideration is zero. In turn, exogenous variation in market size
in the model can be thought of arising from variation in income and/or population or
variation in the level of demand itself.
2.1. Preferences, Technologies, and Optimal Industry Structure
Consider an economy with a large number of consumers having identical incomes
and identical preferences for symmetrically differentiated varieties of a given good
produced by N providers. Preferences have a CES structure (as in Dixit and Stiglitz,







, σ > 1, (1)
where qi is consumption of variety i – the variety produced by provider i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
– and σ is the (constant) elasticity of substitution between different varieties. With
identical preferences and incomes, the utility of a representative individual (1) coin-
cides with social welfare.
The total spend by consumers on all varieties (i.e. market size) is M. Providers face
identical costs, C(qi) = F + c qi for producing a given quantity qi of their variety, where
F represents fixed costs, and c is a constant marginal cost.
We characterize outcomes for two different industry structures, namely competi-
tion between for-profit providers and competition between charities. The planning
optimum, which is common to the two scenarios, is found by maximizing the level of
welfare (which coincides with (1)) by choice of N and for qi = q for all i, subject to the
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which increases proportionally with market size, M. The socially optimal provider




= σF , (3)
which is independent of market size, M, and corresponds to a level of output (quantity)
per provider equal to q∗ = (σ − 1)F/c. The feature that, under symmetric product
differentiation, optimal provider size is invariant to market size — a property that is
central to the analysis that follows — holds under general conditions and does not
hinge on preferences being of the CES form.7
2.2. The For-profit Case
We next derive predictions about the relationship between market size and market
structure in a model of for-profit oligopolistic competition under symmetric product
differentiation.








where pi is the price of variety i. From this, using standard principles, we can derive
an expression for uncompensated demand for variety i:
qi = M P σ−1 pi−σ. (5)
Profits for firm i are πi = (pi − c)qi − F, and associated revenues are ri = piqi.
Each firm, i, then chooses pi so as to maximize its own profits while taking the pricing
choices of all other firms, p−i, as given. For a given N, a symmetric non-cooperative




7A general formulation of symmetric product differentiation specification with preferences defined
by a utility function of the form U = ∑Ni=1 v(qi), v
′(.) > 0, v′′(.) < 0, still implies that optimal provider
size is independent of market size. A departure from symmetric product differentiation – as reflected
by a utility function of the form U = ∑Ni=1 vi(qi), where the vi(.)’s are product-specific – could cause the
result to break down.
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(N − 1)(σ− 1)
)
, xi = x =
M
Nc
(N − 1)(σ− 1)
1 + (N − 1)σ , ∀i, and so
πi = π =
M
1 + (N − 1)σ − F, ∀i. (7)
In an equilibrium with free entry, we must have πi = π = 0, ∀i. This identifies an
equilibrium number of firms, N, as
N =






and thus an equilibrium firm size (variable plus fixed costs, which in equilibrium must
equate revenues) equal to
s = r = M/N =
σF
1 + (σ− 1)F/M < σF = s
∗. (9)
Proposition 1. An increase in market size produces a less-than-proportional increase in the
number of for-profit firms along with an increase in the size of individual firms.
PROOF: The effect of an increase in M on the number of firms, N, after replacing M with


















where s equals firm revenues, r. 
The equilibrium number and size of providers in a for-profit oligopoly equilibrium
with free entry, as identified by (8) and (9), differ from their socially optimum coun-
terparts: the number of firms is inefficiently large and firm size is inefficiently small
(N > N∗ and s < s∗). An increase in market size causes firms to become larger and
closer in size to the socially optimal size (for N approaching infinity, condition (9) coin-
cides with the condition identifying the socially optimal firm size); i.e., a larger market
brings about rationalization in production choices. Intuitively, an increase in market
size induces entry by new firms, causing the demand faced by individual firms to be-
come more price elastic; this lowers mark-ups and gross profit margins, which implies
that, in order to be able to cover fixed costs and break even in a zero-profit equilibrium,
each firm must earn greater revenues.
This result parallels the prediction tested by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) with ref-
erence to an oligopolistic setting where firms produce a homogeneous good but face
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increasing marginal costs. In their model, as in ours, under oligopoly competition be-
tween for-profit providers there is too much entry resulting in a suboptimal firm size;
an increase in market size then raises competition and brings firm size closer to its
socially optimal level.8
A formulation with CES preferences provides an ideal benchmark for modelling
the relationship between competition and firm size, because it implies that for N large
– i.e. under “monopolistic competition” – the decentralized market outcome coincides
with a social planning optimum (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), which would generally not
be the case with non-CES preferences. So, in this model, if the number of competing
firms is sufficiently large, an increase in market size has no effect on firm size. This
means that effects of market size on firm size stem only from oligopolistic responses
(for N small), and that they asymptotically vanish as competition increases.
2.3. Charity Markets
Charities – be they donative charities (non-commercial, i.e. receiving donations) or
commercial charities (charging a price for its output) – differ from for-profit organi-
zations because they face a non-distribution constraint, i.e. they cannot disperse any
surplus of revenues over costs. So, although they can incur surpluses and losses in
the short run, on average (i.e., in a long-run sense) their revenues cannot depart from
their expenditures,9 and so there is no scope for them to pursue a profit maximization
objective.
The discussion in this section relates to the donative charity case, which directly
implies marginal cost pricing; but it can be shown that the same analysis and results
also apply to the case of commercial charities – provided that they operate under the
same non-distribution constraint. In deriving results for the not-for-profit case, we
also abstract from the public good nature of output – if present (the case where char-
ities provide public goods is addressed later, when we discuss results). We consider
a scenario where active charities are simply passive recipients of donations; the only
decision they make is whether or not to become active (entry), a decision that pre-
cedes donors’ giving decisions. We start by examining the case of perfectly prosocially
motivated charities whose payoff coincides with social welfare, and then examine the
implications of departures from a pure pro-social objective.
Suppose that the number, N, of active charities is given. Focusing on symmetric
noncooperative equilibria, a binding non-distribution constraint means that, in order
for providers not to incur a loss, the donations, di, received by provider i must cover
8A classic paper demonstrating the possibility of excess entry in equilibrium is Mankiw and Whin-
ston (1986). See Amir et al. (2014) for an example of a recent extension of that framework.
9Many not-for-profit organizations, such as schools and hospitals, routinely run current-account sur-
pluses that translate into capital-account investments that allow the organization to grow in size. Even
if sustained indefinitely, this pattern is consistent with the organization breaking even in present value
terms, with donors anticipating this and carrying out a forward-looking calculation analogous to the
one we describe here for a static environment. As a robustness check, in our empirical analysis we look
at how market size affects both average expenditures and average revenues of providers.
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full costs, c qi + F, and so qi = (di − F)/c. At the margin, however, donors face a
marginal cost of provision equal to c.10 The allocation of the total spend, M, that max-











di = M. These give
di = d = M/N, (12)
and




The associated level of utility is Nσ/(σ−1)(M/N − F)/c ≡ Û(N), and provider size is
M/N ≡ ŝ(N).
Denoting with ΓE(N) the payoff for a participating representative provider if N
providers are present in total, and with ΓX(N) the payoff for a representative provider
if N providers are present and the provider in question does not participate, the marginal
entry decision, characterizing an equilibrium level of N in a symmetric outcome, is
then identified by the level of N for which ΓE(N) ≥ ΓX(N − 1) and ΓE(N + 1) <
ΓX(N). The payoff for a fully prosocially motivated, not-for-profit provider coin-
cides with social welfare, and thus equals Û(N) = Γ(N) = ΓE(N) = ΓX(N); the
marginal entry decision is then simply given by the inequalities Û(N) ≥ Û(N + 1)




M/N − σ F






and so q = (σ− 1)F/c, which in turn gives
s = r = c q + F = σ F = s∗; (16)
i.e. fully prosocially motivated providers should replicate the socially optimum out-
10A substantial fraction of charities’ revenues come from government, but this need not affect char-
ities’ and donors’ marginal calculations; i.e. if X is a government grant and so qi = (di − F + X)/c,
the marginal cost of provision faced by donors is still c. Matching government grants or tax relief for
donations, on the other hand, can affect the price of giving and thus marginal giving incentives. The
implications and effects of these incentives have been studied by a large literature (which includes Feld-
stein and Clotfelter, 1976; Roberts, 1987; Scharf, 2000; Bakija and Heim, 2011; Almunia et al., 2018). We
will touch on the role of donation subsidies later when we discuss government policies that could be
used to correct for excessive entry.
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come – which, as previously discussed, is independent of market size. This immedi-
ately delivers the following result:
Proposition 2. If charities are fully prosocially motivated, an increase in market size produces
a proportional increase in the number of charities, and so it has no effect on the size of individual
charities.
Unlike in the for-profit case, increased competition in a larger market between
prosocially motivated, not-for-profit providers does not produce a downward pres-
sure on mark-ups that induces providers to become larger – there are no mark-ups.
Consequently, it has no beneficial effect on production choices, which always be effi-
cient independently of market size.11
The assumption that charities are fully prosocially motivated is a strong one; and
indeed a large literature has highlighted how charities may pursue objectives other
than profit maximization or social surplus maximization, such as, for example, the
maximization of own revenues (see the previously mentioned survey by Gaynor and
Town, 2011).
A simple way of modelling a departure from the objective of surplus maximization
is to amend ΓX(N) and ΓE(N) as follows:
ΓE(N) = µ ω̂(N) + Û(N), (17)
where the first term, with µ ≥ 0, is a premium that the charity attaches to its own
activities, above and beyond the charity’s concern for social welfare (prosocial mo-
tivation), and ω̂(N) is a measure of own activities.12 We will consider the impli-
cations of non-prosocial concerns based on two alternative measures: revenue, i.e.
ω̂(N) = r̂(N) = M/N, and market share, i.e. ω̂(N) = 1/N.
While the social surplus component accrues to a charity independently of whether
or not it enters the market, accrual of the non-prosocial component is contingent upon





The presence of a premium on own activities results in a divergence from optimality
with respect to the number and size of providers operating in the charitable market:
for µ = 0, condition (18) coincides with the condition for social surplus maximization,
11These conclusions extend to commercial charities. If a charity is a prosocially motivated commercial
provider pricing at average cost, then the symmetric provision equilibrium for given N coincides with
the one found under marginal cost pricing, as do entry choices.
12This specification is consistent with the literature incorporating additional elements over and above
social surplus in charities’ objectives. Much of that literature however, has not focused on entry deci-
sions, but rather on the effect that these additional elements may have on ex-post competitive conduct.
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i.e. it identifies the socially optimal number of providers for a given market size, M; an
increase in µ from zero starting from the socially optimal N makes the left-hand side of
the above positive, and so N must rise relative to a case with µ = 0 (the total derivative
dN/dµ evaluated at µ = 0 is positive).13
Own-output biased, not-for-profit providers make positively biased entry decisions,
resulting in excessive entry and a suboptimal scale of production. If charities are pas-
sive recipients of donations, the presence of an own-output bias cannot produce a di-
rect positive effect on size for those charities that are active.14 What it can do, however,
is generate a positive entry bias, causing charities to be active even if, in terms of so-
cial welfare (i.e. from the point of view of donors), the variety gains from adding an
additional provider do not justify incurring the additional fixed cost. In equilibrium,
an above-optimal number of providers translates into individual providers being too
small.
In this case, it can be shown that an increase in market size mitigates excessive
entry:
Proposition 3. If charities providers are partially prosocially motivated, being also concerned
about their own revenue or their market share beyond social surplus, an increase in market size
raises the size of individual charities. The number of charities rises less than proportionally
with market size.
PROOF: Considering first a scenario with revenue concerns (ω̂(N) = r = M/N), and letting
r = M/N, we can rewrite the FOC as
µ (σ− 1) r
σ/(σ−1)
σ F− r = M
1/(σ−1). (19)






= 1− σ F− r
σ2F− r < 1. (20)
where the positive sign of the ratio in the second term follows from σ F − r > 0 and σ > 1
(implying σ2 F − r > σ F − r > 0). Totally differentiating (19) with respect to r and M, and







σ2F− r > 0; (21)
where size, s, equals revenue, r. Proceeding in the same way for a scenario with market share
13Some of the literature on not-for-profits, for example, Philipson and Posner (2009) effectively assume
that µ = ∞, i.e. that not-for-profit providers only care about their own output.
14Fundraising competition might possibly do so, but not if charities compete for a fixed total amount,







= 1− σ F− r







σ F− r/σ > 0. (23)

The intuition for this result is that the marginal entrant balances the prosocial op-
portunity cost of entry – the second term in (18) – against the non-prosocial gains from
entering – the first term in (18), which is proportional to size. The larger is market
size (and thus the number of varieties provided) the smaller are the variety gains from
having an additional variety being provided, and so the higher the net social cost to
potential entrants (who are partially driven by prosocial motives) of adding varieties
above the socially optimum number while sacrificing scale in the provision of existing
varieties, which in turn discourages entry.15
Thus, if charities are biased towards their own activities, an increase in market size
can mitigate incentives for excessive entry and raise provider size closer to its socially
optimum level, as it does in the for-profit case. In the for-profit case, this happens
because increased competition raises the elasticity of firm-specific demand and lowers
mark-ups, which in turn forces firms to operate on a larger scale in order to cover fixed
costs. In the not-for-profit case, the effect does not come from increased competition in
the traditional sense of the term; rather, a larger market size raises the relative social
cost of pursuing non-prosocial objectives.
2.4. Discussion
The theoretical implications of our analysis are, in principle, empirically testable.
On the basis of Propositions 2 and 3, if we observe provider size in charity markets
to be invariant with respect to market size, this should be interpreted as a reflection
of providers being purely prosocially motivated, whereas if we see provider size to
increase in M, we should conclude that providers must be only partially prosocially
motivated.
Our discussion has focused on scenarios where providers are homogeneous in terms
of their technology and size. In Appendix A, we show that in a for-profit, monopolis-
tically competitive scenario where the distribution of productivity types is Pareto – a
15For a given provider size, r = M/N, the absolute value of the marginal social cost of adding varieties
above the optimum equals (M/r)1/(σ−1) (σ F− r)/
(
σ− 1), which is increasing in M. The prediction of
Proposition 3 could be reversed if the marginal valuation of social welfare in the charities’ objective was
decreasing in the level of social welfare. In this case, the marginal effect of a given marginal deviation
from the optimal level of social welfare is decreasing in market size. If the decline is large enough,
a larger market size can weaken the effect of own-output bias relative to that of pro-social concerns,
which discourages entry and raises size.
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specification widely adopted in the literature that focuses on firm heterogeneity, fol-
lowing Hopenhayn (1992) – average firm size is invariant to a change in market size.
The same is true for not-for-profit providers. Thus, under these conditions, even when
providers are heterogeneous in terms of their size, effects of market size on firm size
should come solely from oligopolistic responses. This also implies that an estima-
tion strategy that focuses on the average size of charities in the market is appropriate
whether or not firms are heterogeneous in size.16
We have abstracted from the fact that in many cases the goods that are funded by
private donations and provided by charities are public goods. Accounting for the pub-
lic good nature of not-for-profit provision, however, does not change the structure of
the question or the conclusions. The main implication is that there are positive exter-
nalities that are not accounted for in the donation decision of individual donors, i.e.
for any given variety the social effect on the quantity available for consumption from
an additional dollar of donations towards that variety is larger than the corresponding
private effect (the effect that is accounted for in donations choices) by a constant factor
that equals the number of donors/users of the good. If income can also be used for
private consumption – unlike in the formulation of preferences (1) that we have used
to develop our arguments – then, for any given variety, the amount supplied will be
below the social optimum. However, conditional on this wedge being in place for any
number of providers, the (second-best) socially optimal level of N is as before, and
conclusions concerning the effect of an increase in market size on charity size are the
same as for a scenario with private goods.17
We have also abstracted from the role of fundraising in the competition between
charities for donors. Loosely speaking, fundraising can be thought of as lowering the
perceived price of giving (or equivalently as raising the perceived benefits of giving) to
donors, and so in this respect it has analogous effects to a donation subsidy. But unlike
donation subsidies, fundraising involves real costs and so it inefficiently dissipates re-
sources. Rose-Ackerman (1982) was among the first study to point to a link between
the non-prosocial motives of competing charities and ‘excessive’ (socially wasteful)
fundraising: for a given total spend, M, competitive fundraising reduces the funds
available to finance provision and hence welfare (assuming that it does not directly
affect the value of charities’ activities), and so fundraising competition is a symptom
of charities’ conduct departing from social welfare maximization. From this perspec-
tive, if charities are, at least in part, driven by non-prosocial motives, we would ex-
16In our case, the distribution of charity sizes is broadly consistent with Pareto, that is, there are many
small charities and a long tail of larger charities. Moreover, we show that our empirical results are robust
to conducting the analysis at the level of individual charities instead of the market average.
17Suppose for example, that there are K donors with identical preferences and all contributing to the
same varieties of public goods; and that preferences are quasilinear in the public good composite, as
defined by (1), with the utility function taking the form y + θUη , with η ∈ (0, 1). If we compare the
cooperative and noncooperative levels of spending (M) on collective goods in this case, the noncooper-
ative level is lower by a factor K1/(η−1) < 1. However, other than for the fact that M is at a suboptimal
level, our analysis and results goes trough unchanged.
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pect changes in the degree of competition between them to be reflected in changes in
their fundraising efforts; and vice-versa, observing an empirical relationship between
inter-charity competition and fundraising effort would be indicative of non-prosocial
motives in inter-charity competition.
In theoretical terms, however, the sign of the relationship between the degree of
competition and the intensity of charities’ fundraising efforts is not a priori clear: hav-
ing to compete with more charities may prompt a charity to do more fundraising, but
it may also reduce the effectiveness of any given fundraising promotion, inducing a
charity to reduce its fundraising efforts. In a model of differentiated charity provision
(which assumes CES preferences as we do in ours), Castaneda et al. (2008) show that
increased competition (an increase in the number of competing charities) is predicted
to raise the share of charities’ expenditures devoted to fundraising.18 Thus, an increase
in market size, provided it that raises the number of charities, should cause fundraising
costs to rise in relative terms.
Finally, our theoretical framework can also provide testable predictions with re-
spect to the comparison between for-profits and charities. This, however, requires
making some additional ceteris paribus assumptions. For the same size and the same
technology and preferences parameters (F, c and σ), the theory predicts that, when
charities’ non-prosocial concerns relate to market share, the elasticity of provider size
with respect to market size (expression (23)) should be larger in the not-for-profit case
than in the for-profit case (expression (11)); i.e., assuming that the departure from op-
timal size is the same in both situations – in one case due to mark-ups in the other to a
non-prosocial bias as represented by a positive µ – when we increase the market size,
provider size should respond comparatively more in the not-for-profit case. If chari-
ties’ non-prosocial concerns relate to revenues, on the other hand, the comparison is
ambiguous. Also note that, since market size equals M = Ns (where s is size), if the
positive elasticity of s with respect to an increase in market size is larger for charities
than it is for for-profit providers, then the positive elasticity of N with respect to an
increase in market size must be smaller for non-profits than it is for for-profits; and
vice-versa.
There is a widespread presumption amongst both academic economists and practi-
tioners that free competition is the most effective cure for monopolistic inefficiencies in
private markets. Market enlargement, resulting either from increased economic activ-
ity or from integration of previously segmented markets (e.g. following a reduction in
trade costs) intensifies competition, reducing the market power of individual firms and
improving allocative efficiency. This idea is based on well-established notions of firms’
incentives in for-profit markets; but previously it has not been clear if and how it car-
ries over to the case of not-for-profit providers. If charities’ motives depart from pure
18In their analysis an increase in inter-charity competition is modelled as an increase in the number of
charities. In ours, the size of individual charities also changes; if there are scale economies in fundraising,
there could be further effects on fundraising effort, which could compound with the effects described
by Castaneda et al. (2008).
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prosocial objectives, they will choose to operate at a scale that is sub-optimally small,
just as in the for-profit case. In this case, any intervention that encourages charities to
increase their size is efficiency-enhancing. Then, as we have shown, increased com-
petition from a larger market size can correct for the excessive entry and sub-optimal
size, just as in the for-profit case. The novel lesson is that for charities the effect oper-
ates through the tradeoff faced by providers between their prosocial and non-prosocial
motives, rather than through a change in the elasticity of demand they face as in the
for-profit case.19
3. Empirical Evidence
3.1. Data, Measurement and Sample Selection
Charitable contributions in Canada are eligible for tax relief, with tax receipts pro-
vided to donors by the organizations to whom the donation is made. The Canada
Customs and Revenue Authority (CCRA) keeps track of these tax receipts by requir-
ing all issuing organizations to file an annual information return, the T3010, within a
specified period after the end of the charity’s financial year. Among other things, infor-
mation contained on the forms includes charities’ fiscal period end, their registration
number, detailed information about their revenues and expenditures, their geographi-
cal areas of activities (municipal; provincial; national; international);20 their full postal
address; and a summary of their main activities. Our raw data consists of the universe
of T3010 forms submitted to CCRA over the period 1997-2005 and 2011.
These data consists of 84,677 charities (in the year 2011). The most common type
of charity is a religious organization, which we do not consider here. We focus on six
charity service sectors that are likely to benefit only local residents, providing public
services that could in principle be also provided by the public sector and that are well
represented in the data: food and clothing banks, daycare centers, housing charities,
senior care, disabled care, and charities organizing festivals and performances.21
Given the information available in our data, we could define geographic markets as
municipalities (i.e., Census Sub-Divisions (CSD)), Forward Sortation Areas (FSA), Cen-
sus Metropolitan Areas (CMA) or Census Agglomerations (CA). The market definition
is important as the results are not robust to this choice. In Appendix C, we analyze in
detail which option is preferable, concluding that CSDs define the relevant markets. In
short, we provide both a theoretical argument and simulation evidence in support of
19A direct policy intervention to offset excessive entry would involve raising the cost of opportunity
cost of entry, i.e. “taxing” entry. For example, government grants to charities could be structured so as
to raise the opportunity cost of entry, either by limiting the extent to which funds can be used to cover
entry costs or by rewarding larger, more established firms. A limitation of such an approach, however,
is that there may be other good reasons for not adopting policies that could undermine charities’ ability
to deal with core costs (Perroni et al., 2018).
20This information is only available until 2008.
21These sectors and their selection criteria are described in more detail in the Appendix B.
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the claim that, for the purpose of studying our question, focusing on markets that are
too small can bias our estimates of the elasticity of provider size with respect to market
size towards zero, while using markets that are too large does not lead to any bias.
Reflecting this argument, we conduct our main analysis at three different geography
levels: FSA (small), CSD (medium), and CMA/CA (large). We find that the results are
consistent with CSDs being the relevant markets (or at least a good approximation).
Indeed, assuming CSDs are the relevant markets, we would expect to find smaller es-
timates in the FSA-level analysis, since FSAs are often smaller than CSDs. We would
also expect to find similar estimates in CMA/CA- and CSD-level analyses, since CMAs
and CAs are strictly larger than CSDs. This is indeed mostly the case. In the pooled
analysis of all six sectors (and in five of six individual charitable sectors), the elasticity
of charity size with respect to market size is lower at the FSA level than at the CSD
level. Similarly, in the pooled analysis and in four sectors, the estimates are compara-
ble at the CSD and CMA level. Therefore, we are confident that CSD is the preferable
unit of analysis in our case amongst those available.
Therefore, markets are defined at the level of Census Sub-Divisions (CSD), a sta-
tistical unit defined by Statistics Canada that usually corresponds to municipalities as
defined by the provincial governments. As the borders of CSDs change often, such as
when municipalities merge or secede, to keep our units of observation stable through
our analysis, we use the 2011 CSD definitions to define our markets. We adjust the
data from earlier years to correspond as closely as possible to 2011 CSDs. We then
assign each charity to its market with geospatial software, using either the geographic
coordinates of the charity (available until 2005), or the address and postal code (for
2011).22
Average charity size in a market is measured as the average of charities’ total ex-
penditures in the market. Market size is measured by the total population in the CSD.
We construct a panel with information on market characteristics by linking our charity
data to Canadian census data from years 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011 at the CSD level,
by linking 1996 Census data to 1997 charity information, and 2006 Census data to 2005
charity information. Being able to rely on a panel with five years intervals between
each cross-section is useful for our estimation purposes, as it hopefully gives us infor-
mation on within-market, over-time variation in market size – the main explanatory
variable.
We complement our analysis of not-for-profit markets with a comparable data set
on for-profits firms. Every business in Canada that fills an annual tax form (including
the usual T2 but also the T3010 filled by charities) is included in the Canadian Business
Register (BR), maintained by Statistics Canada. We have data from the BR from 2007 to
2011: Number of firms by employment category, Dissemination Area (small statistical
area of 400 to 700 population) and 6-digit NAICS industry. We aggregate Dissemina-
tion Areas (DA) at the level of Census Subdivisions. Since a direct mapping between
22Appendix D explains the construction of our dataset in more detail.
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DAs and CSDs is not available in Statistics Canada, we use GIS software and boundary
files to allocate DAs to CSDs (see Appendix D for more details). The BR data contains
employment information only by size categories and geographic unit. Unlike the char-
ity data, it is not at the individual business level. From this dataset, we calculate the
number and average employment of firms by 6-digit industries and CSD. The number
of firms is given by employment size category (1 to 4 employees, 5 to 9, 10 to 19, 20 to
49, 50 to 99, 100 to 199, 200 to 499, and 500 or more.). To measure average firm size, we
use the mid-point of each size category, times the number of firms in that category. We
do not count firms of indeterminate size.
One important limitation of this data is that the BR includes both for-profit and not-
for-profit entities, and there is no reliable way of excluding the charities from the BR
on the basis of the information that is available. Still, comparing patterns found in the
charity data with corresponding patterns found in the BR data can allow for an indirect
comparison between charities and for-profit providers, although the difference in the
elasticity estimates obtained for the two dataset will understate the difference between
the responses of for-profit and not-for-profit providers.
The nature of the data also calls for some further sample selection. In the Canadian
system, the costs to an organization to remain registered as a charity are negligible. Ac-
cordingly, in the Charity data we observe many instances in which a charity remains
registered in a given year but is inactive (dormant), i.e., it reports zero expenditures or
it provides no expenditure information. In some cases, charities report expenditures
that are negligible, which strongly suggests de facto dormancy. To deal with this mea-
surement problem, we treat charities as inactive if they report expenditures less than
CDN$30,00023 – or if they do not report them at all. Nevertheless, any minimum cost,
revenue or expenditure threshold that we may want to set in order to discriminate
between active and inactive charities is necessarily arbitrary. We investigate the ro-
bustness of the results to the inclusion of the smaller charities: results are quite similar
to our main results.
In addition to excluding charities below the CDN$30,000 threshold, when analyz-
ing the effects of market size on expenditures, we only include those charities that are
active for the full duration of the sample. Given this sample restriction, the size of the
charities that are continuously active is implicitly taken as being representative of all
charities, including those that are not continuously active. This may be desirable be-
cause the classification of charity sectors can be quite broad, and an increase in market
size may attract a wider variety of charity types, which could affect average provider
size for reasons other than the competition mechanism that we want to focus on. For
example, new senior care entrants may possibly not provide the standard care service
but perhaps only some consulting. Such new entrants could be small due to being
different, but not due to the effect of market size in the way that we think about it
in the theoretical model. Focusing on how the size of charities already in the market
23This amount corresponds to the revenue limit needed to be included in public data from the BR.
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responds to market size change provides a cleaner test of our theoretical predictions.
However, we also carried out the regressions using the full sample of active charities,
and results are quite similar to our main results. Moreover, as this sample restriction
omits any entrant and exiting charities, and thus removes any time series variation in
the number of charities in each market, we relax this restriction when analyzing the
effect of market size on the number of charities.
3.2. Analysis
The testable predictions of our model concern the effects of market size on the num-
ber and size of charities.24 To analyze these relationships in the data, we focus on the
number of charities and their average size within individual markets. Our main spec-
ification estimates the following equation:
ln Yit = α + θt + γ ln Market_Sizeit + x′itβ + εit, (24)
with markets indexed by i, and t ∈ {1997, 2001, 2005, 2011}. In our main specifications,
our variable of interest, Market_Sizeit, is measured as the total population in a market
in a given year, and the outcome, Yit, as the number of providers in the market in a
given year or the average level of expenditures by providers in a market in a given
year. The vector xit includes a number of market-specific control variables.25 We also
include year fixed effects (θt). In the market fixed-effects specifications, α is replaced
with αi.
To begin with, we present descriptive statistics on these main outcome variables of
interest in Table 1. We have altogether 5,253 markets, many of which do not contain any
charities operating in our chosen sectors. After the sample restrictions, with reference
to the year 2011, we use information on 403 markets containing food and clothing
banks, 399 markets for daycare centers, 463 markets for housing charities, 413 markets
for senior care and 446 markets for disabled care organizations as well as 304 markets
for charities organizing festivals and performances. All the variables appear to contain
considerable variation across markets.
Our main results are shown in Table 2 for the association between market size and
average charity size, and in Table 3 for the association between market size and the
number of providers. Both tables include results from pooled (across years) OLS re-
gressions and market-level fixed-effects regressions, with and without additional con-
trol variables. The sample includes all the four years in the panel (1996, 2001, 2006
and 2011). The tables report first the results from analyzing all the sectors jointly, and
then the results for each sector separately. The benefit of the former is higher precision
of the estimates and of the latter scope for understanding whether charities behave
differently in different sectors.
24For similar analysis in the context of for-profits, see Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005, 2007).
25These variables are: log of mean household income, share of population over sixty-five years old,
share of population under five years old, share without a high school diploma, share with university
degree, share of immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Charities and Business Register, by CSD, for 2011
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Charities, Number of Providers (exp.>30,000)
Daycare 399 2.65 9.12 1 132
Food and Clothing Banks 403 2.41 5.36 1 75
Housing 463 2.69 6.63 1 90
Seniors 413 2.11 5.27 1 72
Disabled 446 3.29 7.74 1 99
Festivals and Performances 304 4.97 16.9 1 193
Charities, Average Employment (Non-dormant, exp.>30,000)
Daycare 315 37.1 35.2 2.50 249.5
Food and Clothing Banks 154 12.4 13.6 2.50 68
Housing 279 40.4 62.5 2.50 500
Seniors 179 22.8 49.6 2.50 349.5
Disabled 295 72.9 85.1 2.50 500
Festivals and Performances 111 15.4 25.1 2.50 172.3
Charities, Average Expenditures (Non-dormant, exp.>30,000)
Daycare 323 1,074,483 1,219,222 31,853 8,641,190
Food and Clothing Banks 190 409,487 647,394 30,277 5,408,711
Housing 317 1,571,627 2,440,329 35,008 23,707,902
Seniors 208 757,937 2,048,451 32,776 23,115,650
Disabled 312 2,614,811 4,045,785 31,997 51,355,444
Festivals and Performances 148 445,053 1,110,827 33,000 12,617,122
Business Register, Number of Providers (exp.>30,000)
Daycare 1,390 6.63 35.1 1 964
Food and Clothing Banks 2,634 23.0 154.0 1 5,059
Housing 1,603 6.36 42.3 1 1,313
Seniors and Disabled 890 4.21 13.1 1 237
Festivals and Performances 563 5.59 28.7 1 439
Business Register, Average Employment (exp.>30,000)
Daycare 1,390 12.4 13.0 2.50 149.5
Food and Clothing Banks 2,634 13.1 12.3 2.50 349.5
Housing 1,603 5.36 6.72 2.50 76
Seniors and Disabled 890 19.6 34.6 2.50 500
Festivals and Performances 563 7.71 17.6 2.50 349.5
18
Given that our data has a panel structure, we have a choice to make between pooled
OLS or market level fixed-effects regressions. One potential endogeneity issue in our
analysis is that large markets may have higher population density, thus possibly lead-
ing to larger (unobserved) fixed costs for firms (e.g., through higher house and land
prices, or wages). Large markets may also feature more elastic demand as they may
contain a wider variety of choices. Both features would translate in larger markets con-
taining larger producers even if an increase in the size of each market does not lower
mark-ups. This would result in a spurious positive correlation between market size
and establishment size. The benefit of fixed-effects estimation is that it may alleviate
these concerns. However, one drawback of fixed-effects estimation is that market sizes
may not vary enough over time for there to be enough identifying variation.26 In some
sense this is a standard bias vs. precision trade-off (pooling the six sectors increases the
precision somewhat). In addition, even with fixed effects, we cannot rule out poten-
tial endogeneity as the omitted variables may also change with market size changes.
Moreover, fixed effects can potentially even increase the estimate bias arising from en-
dogeneity if the time series correlation between market size and unobserved economic
conditions is stronger than the cross-sectional correlation. Due to these issues, our
analysis should be taken merely as suggestive evidence.
Table 2 reports our results on average charity size. We discuss first the joint anal-
ysis of all six sectors. Both with and without control variables, we find a statistically
significant positive association between market size and charity size. The elasticities
are all well below unity (0.22 and 0.24), and they are precisely estimated. In the last
two columns, we add CSD-level fixed effects. With these fixed effects, both with and
without control variables, the relationship between market size and provider size is ab-
sent, with coefficients close to zero. However, the standard errors are almost 10 times
larger than without the fixed effects. Nonetheless, 95% confidence intervals can rule
out effects larger than about 0.2. The sector by sector analysis does not reveal much
differences across sectors. In the OLS specifications (columns 1 and 2), the point esti-
mates are very close to each other, varying between 0.15 and 0.35. In the fixed-effects
specifications (columns 3 and 4), the estimates vary a lot across the sectors, but due to
the imprecision, it is not possible to infer any differences between the sectors.
In Table 3 we report the results on the association between market size and the
number of charities. The results show a robust pattern of positive and statistically
significant association across the specifications both for all the sectors jointly analyzed
and the individual sectors. The only exception is the daycare sector, where the fixed-
effects results are negative and statistically not significant. An important result is that
the estimated elasticities are also all well below unity, and unity is also well outside
any reasonable confidence interval.
To interpret the results in Tables 2 and 3, recall first that Proposition 2 predicts that if
our charities are fully prosocially motivated, an increase in market size would increase
26In sample of markets relevant for the analysis pooling all six sectors, the within-market standard
deviation in log(population) is 0.09 while the overall standard deviation is 1.67.
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Table 2: Association Between Market Population (in log) and Average Expenditures (in log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.22*** 0.24*** -0.0077 -0.053
(0.014) (0.019) (0.11) (0.13)
N 5521 5338 5521 5338
R2 0.113 0.122 0.027 0.011
Daycare 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.043 0.053
(0.023) (0.032) (0.17) (0.18)
N 1214 1171 1214 1171
R2 0.259 0.311 0.165 0.143
Food and Clothing Banks 0.24*** 0.35*** 0.42 0.25
(0.036) (0.042) (0.26) (0.29)
N 635 614 635 614
R2 0.232 0.295 0.227 0.165
Housing 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.063 -0.088
(0.027) (0.042) (0.12) (0.12)
N 1208 1161 1208 1161
R2 0.160 0.191 0.101 0.000
Seniors 0.21*** 0.24*** -0.10 -0.091
(0.033) (0.049) (0.28) (0.47)
N 755 733 755 733
R2 0.094 0.102 0.004 0.001
Disabled 0.35*** 0.28*** -0.038 -0.24
(0.033) (0.051) (0.15) (0.19)
N 1181 1154 1181 1154
R2 0.190 0.270 0.021 0.000
Festivals and Performances 0.15*** 0.22*** 0.28 0.73*
(0.038) (0.049) (0.36) (0.42)
N 528 505 528 505
R2 0.075 0.129 0.072 0.077
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(average expenditures). The table shows the coefficients on
ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. All mod-
els include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of mean
household income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under 5
years old, share without a high school diploma, share with university degree, share of
immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table 3: Association between Market Size (in log) and Number of Providers (in log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.32*** 0.37*** 0.098*** 0.087**
(0.024) (0.023) (0.032) (0.035)
N 8937 8630 8937 8630
R2 0.470 0.553 0.456 0.470
Daycare 0.30*** 0.34*** -0.083 -0.12
(0.029) (0.033) (0.073) (0.084)
N 1505 1447 1505 1447
R2 0.462 0.545 0.432 0.402
Food and Clothing Banks 0.32*** 0.39*** 0.22** 0.27**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.099) (0.12)
N 1299 1265 1299 1265
R2 0.488 0.607 0.481 0.521
Housing 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.13** 0.14**
(0.022) (0.025) (0.066) (0.066)
N 1748 1678 1748 1678
R2 0.488 0.562 0.480 0.466
Seniors 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.18* 0.25**
(0.028) (0.031) (0.093) (0.12)
N 1455 1397 1455 1397
R2 0.373 0.458 0.372 0.390
Disabled 0.39*** 0.47*** 0.14** 0.13
(0.024) (0.024) (0.071) (0.092)
N 1742 1698 1742 1698
R2 0.549 0.640 0.537 0.530
Festivals and Performances 0.41*** 0.47*** 0.24*** 0.25***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.083) (0.096)
N 1188 1145 1188 1145
R2 0.515 0.631 0.508 0.592
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(number of providers). The table shows the coefficients on
ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. All mod-
els include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of mean
household income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under 5
years old, share without a high school diploma, share with university degree, share of
immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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their number proportionally, but not their average size. In contrast, Proposition 3 pre-
dicts that for only partially prosocially motivated charities, market size raises the size
of providers, and the number of providers increases less than proportionally with mar-
ket size. The results in Table 3 clearly point towards the charities’ motives not being
fully prosocial. However, the results in Table 2 are more ambiguous, as non-prosocial
motives are only supported by the specifications (1) and (2). Overall, the results point
more towards charities being only partially prosocially motived.
To find additional support for our theoretical interpretation of the relationship be-
tween market size and the size and number of charities, we can look at how market
size affects fundraising. As discussed in Section 2, we would expect an increase in
market size to raise the share of fundraising costs in total costs if charities’ motives are
not fully prosocial.
Table 4 presents results of regressions of market size on the average share of expen-
ditures dedicated to fundraising activities. As in previous specifications, these results
are expressed as elasticities.27 The number of observations is lower, since information
on fundraising is missing for many charities. The analysis using all sectors combined
points towards a positive elasticity, as the estimates are positive in all four specifi-
cations, and statistically significant in three of them. The sector-by-sector analysis is
somewhat less robust, as the statistical significance of the estimates, and sometimes
even their sign, changes with the fixed effects one way or the other. However, a pos-
itive and statistically significant estimate is present in every sector, and none of the
(rare) negative coefficients are statistically significant. These patterns are again more
in line with an explanation where charities are partially prosocially motivated, which
leads to both excessive entry and fundraising. In that case, a larger market size (lead-
ing to increased competition) not only mitigates the bias in entry, increasing the size
of charities and bringing it closer to the social optimum, but also, at the same time,
exacerbates the positive bias in fundraising.
3.3. Comparison to the Private Sector
Our theoretical framework provides testable predictions also with respect to the
comparison between for-profits and not-for-profits. As discussed in Section 2, the the-
ory predicts that when charities’ non-prosocial concerns relate to market share, the
elasticity of provider size with respect to market size should be larger in the not-for-
profit case than in the for-profit case. Similarly, with non-prosocial charities, the elas-
ticity of the number of providers with respect to market size should be smaller in the
not-for-profit case than in the for-profit case.
27The share of fundraising expenditures reflects a ratio, so it is not clear whether we should esti-
mate our regressions in log-log form. In fact, using a linear form we do not find any statistically
significant effect of market size on the share of fundraising expenditures, although the estimates are
mostly positive. However, a Box-Cox regression (with controls, using all six sectors) suggests an optimal
θ = 0.076, which is close to a logarithmic specification. Moreover, a comparison of the log-likelihoods
with θ = {−1, 0, 1} suggests that θ = 0 is the most appropriate model, corresponding to a logarithmic
specification.
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Table 4: Association between Market Size (in log) and the Share of Fundraising Expenditures
(in log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.99* 0.60
(0.025) (0.037) (0.51) (0.63)
N 2416 2356 2416 2356
R2 0.034 0.043 0.028 0.024
Daycare 0.015 0.097 1.97* 1.68
(0.039) (0.060) (1.04) (1.13)
N 628 608 628 608
R2 0.018 0.066 0.001 0.005
Food and Clothing Banks 0.17*** 0.15 1.78 0.53
(0.062) (0.093) (1.11) (1.68)
N 300 293 300 293
R2 0.052 0.094 0.034 0.030
Housing 0.29*** 0.41*** -0.43 -3.48
(0.071) (0.11) (2.16) (2.53)
N 253 247 253 247
R2 0.099 0.157 0.069 0.085
Seniors 0.093 0.0068 3.45** 5.30**
(0.068) (0.11) (1.47) (2.27)
N 307 303 307 303
R2 0.019 0.039 0.008 0.010
Disabled 0.27*** 0.25*** -0.026 -0.62
(0.059) (0.097) (0.91) (0.95)
N 606 598 606 598
R2 0.065 0.119 0.010 0.035
Festivals and Performances 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.44 0.89
(0.056) (0.067) (1.04) (2.00)
N 322 307 322 307
R2 0.067 0.099 0.051 0.032
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(share of fundraising expenditures). The table shows the coefficients
on ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. All
models include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of mean
household income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under 5
years old, share without a high school diploma, share with university degree, share of
immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Besides providing yet another angle for testing the model, the comparison of for-
profits to charities may help in alleviating some of the endogeneity issues discussed
before. Assuming the endogeneity issues related to unobserved costs and demand are
similar for charities and for-profits, they are largely differenced out when we compare
the elasticities estimated from the for-profit data to those from the charity data. That
is, even if both the estimates are biased, their difference is not. Therefore, we focus the
analysis here only to the OLS specifications without fixed effects, as the differencing
alleviates endogeneity issues. Moreover, the fixed-effects specifications of these com-
parisons are too imprecise to teach us much (they reported in the online supplementary
material).
Previously, we used expenditures as our measure of producer size. In the Busi-
ness Register data, however, only employment is available. For that reason, we use
employment also as the measure of producer size in the charity data to carry out our
comparisons. Another difficulty lies in the way BR data is made available publicly:
we do not have micro-level data, or a direct measure of average size of providers in a
market. Instead, we have the number of firms per category of employment size, from
which we infer average employment in the market. In order to facilitate the compar-
isons, we first create a similar categorization by employment in the charities data, and
then estimate average employment from those categories. Therefore, we have calcu-
lated the average employment variable for the charity data in exactly the same way as
in the BR data, despite this leading to lower accuracy of information in the charities
data. We also omit some markets from the analysis relative to the previous tables in
order to include exactly the same set of markets in the for-profit as for the not-for profit
analysis. For that reason, the number of observations are not the same in these tables
compared to the previous ones.
We manually match the NAICS 6-digit industries that seem to best correspond to
the six charity sectors chosen for our analysis, using the sector and industry definitions.
For some industries the comparison is straightforward. For example, there are both
for-profits and not-for-profits providing daycare services, and they all operate under
the same single NAICS code. On the other extreme are charities providing food and
clothing banks, which we compare to all private businesses who provide food and
clothing (cafeterias, limited service restaurants, grocery retail stores, etc.). In that case,
we may be comparing across somewhat different products.28
Table 5 describes the association between market size and average employment
per charity and the number of providers, both for charities and for the providers in
the Business Register. We report the coefficient and standard errors regarding both
these data sets, as well as the p-value of a t-test for whether these two coefficients
are different from each other. For the joint analysis of all sectors we find positive and
statistically significant associations for both the data sets, outcomes and specifications.
The key result is that the elasticity of provider size with respect market size is larger
28The full list of correspondences is described in the Appendix E.
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for charities than for the BR, whereas the opposite is true for the elasticity of number
of providers with respect to the market size. Both of these results are in line with
charities pursuing non-prosocial motives. The differences are statistically significant
in three out of four specifications.
The interpretation of results on the number of providers is not straightforward,
since the BR dataset includes both charities and for-profit firms – and so, by construc-
tion, the number of providers is always larger in that dataset. If our regressions were
comparing levels across datasets, this would mechanically imply a larger coefficient for
the BR dataset. However, because we calculate elasticities, coefficients are comparable
across the two datasets, and the larger coefficients in the BR data imply a larger elastic-
ities for for-profit firms than for charities. When it comes to the number of providers,
the results hold also for each individual sector. However, the provider size results are
more imprecise in the sector-by-sector analysis, with statistically significant differences
only in the case of daycare (in both specifications). Interestingly, the daycare sector was
also the one with the most direct correspondence to a NAICS industry, and thus, per-
haps the most reliable comparison. Overall, despite some limitations, the results in
this and the previous subsection are at least suggestive of charities not acting in a fully
prosocially motivated way.
3.4. Robustness Checks and Discussion
To assess the reliability of our findings, we conduct several robustness checks. First,
we use average revenues instead of average expenditures as an alternative measure of
charity size. This is to account for the fact that charities face a non-distribution con-
straint that is only binding in the long run, but expenses and costs do not have to
balance on a short-term basis (and they do not, particularly for not-for-profit organi-
zations that incur large capital expenses, such as hospitals). The results confirm our
previous findings.29
Second, we use alternative definitions of market size. For the senior and disabled
care sector we re-define market size as the number of old residents (over 65 years old),
and for the daycare sector as the number of young (under 5 years old). It should be
noted that while these measures are likely to capture better the size of the market in
terms of demand for these services in these industries, it is not clear that they are better
than overall population size at measuring the volume of donations that charities are
competing for. The results are similar to those obtained using total population.
Third, we estimate our regressions with a sample that also includes dormant chari-
ties. Our results do not change significantly. Fourth, results are also robust to trimming
out large (top 5% in terms of population) and small (bottom 5%) markets, which is an
indication that outliers are not driving the results. Fifth, instead of estimating our re-
gressions using the average size of charities in a market as the outcome, we estimate
our regressions with individual charities as the unit of observation, and thus the size
29The tables reporting the results of this robustness check and the following ones in this section are all
available in the online supplementary material.
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Table 5: Association between Market Population (in log), and Average Employment (in log) and the
Number of Providers (in log), Charities Only vs. Business Register (Pooled OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Average Employment Number of Providers
All Five Sectors
Charities 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.46*** 0.50***
(0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.025)
Business Register 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.95*** 0.99***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016)
t-test (p-value) 0.002 0.160 0.000 0.000
Daycare
Charities 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.31*** 0.31***
(0.029) (0.035) (0.041) (0.039)
Business Register 0.058*** 0.088*** 0.79*** 0.78***
(0.022) (0.027) (0.032) (0.035)
t-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Festivals
Charities 0.075 0.046 0.40*** 0.45***
(0.081) (0.098) (0.10) (0.081)
Business Register 0.12** 0.19** 0.62*** 0.61***
(0.054) (0.085) (0.10) (0.10)
t-test (p-value) 0.500 0.070 0.000 0.070
Housing
Charities 0.12** 0.17* 0.36*** 0.33***
(0.053) (0.092) (0.044) (0.049)
Business Register 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.83*** 0.82***
(0.030) (0.041) (0.046) (0.051)
t-test (p-value) 0.954 0.590 0.000 0.000
Seniors and Disabled
Charities 0.26*** 0.11 0.38*** 0.44***
(0.046) (0.071) (0.039) (0.045)
Business Register 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.65*** 0.72***
(0.037) (0.058) (0.029) (0.034)
t-test (p-value) 0.205 0.626 0.000 0.000
Food and clothing
Charities 0.23*** 0.44*** 0.23*** 0.34***
(0.056) (0.069) (0.032) (0.040)
Business Register 0.14*** 0.081** 0.98*** 1.05***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.034) (0.055)
t-test (p-value) 0.241 0.000 0.000 0.000
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcomes are ln(average employment) and ln(number of providers). The table shows the co-
efficients on ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. Tests
are for the equality of the coefficients across datasets, combined using suest in Stata. All models
include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of mean household in-
come, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under 5 years old, share without a
high school diploma, share with university degree, share of immigrants, unemployment rate, log of
average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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of each individual charity as the outcome. The results are robust also to this change of
specification. Sixth, to address the possible concern that government funding might be
treated differently than private donor funding when competing for donations and in
regulating the charities’ profits, we investigate how results change if we add the share
of government funding as a control variable. The results are robust also to expanding
the specification in this way. Seventh, we use the median of expenditures instead of the
average, to account for potential differences in the distributions across markets. The
results are robust to this modification. Eighth, we add province, and province × year
fixed effects, since provinces could introduce different policies at different times that
affect both population levels and the size of charities. The results are robust to this
modification.
Another potential source of bias for our regressions using the charities data is that
we are missing information on the number of other active producers in these mar-
kets. However, this is unlikely to lead to wrong conclusions for two reasons. First,
our model’s predictions apply to each individual producer; we use the average over
providers as the outcome only because we need a market-level variable. But since
the prediction applies to each individual provider, average size should respond in the
same way in any subset of producers in a given market. Second, the presence of pri-
vate or public producers is very likely to vary across sectors, and is nonexistent in the
Food and Clothing Banks sectors. If this omitted information was driving the results,
we should see more heterogeneity in results across the sectors in terms of qualitative
conclusions.
Because the 2011 data does not contain information on whether a charity operates
at the local, regional or national level, we use all charities in our main estimations.
However, our theoretical model relates to charities providing services and competing
for donations in a single market; it does not consider the implications of competition
in overlapping markets. To restrict the analysis to well-defined markets, we carry out
the same analysis for a restricted sample in which we omit year 2011 data and only
include local charities, that is those charities that report being active only within their
municipality. These results confirm those from our main specification.
Finally, we conduct one additional robustness check regarding the comparison be-
tween charities and for-profits. In one sector, housing, the Business Register data is
available separately for non-profits and for-profits. In particular, NAICS code 531111
is for lessors of residential buildings except social housing, while NAICS code 531112
is for lessors of social housing projects. While the latter includes both government-
funded entities and private non-profit housing corporations, it is the closest we have
to a direct comparison of non-profit to for-profit organisations providing compara-
ble services using the same dataset. Repeating the analysis of Table 5, but comparing
across these two NAICS codes, we find a similar pattern as in our main analysis. In the
housing sector, the elasticity of provider size with respect to market size is larger for
non-profits, while the elasticity of the number of providers with respect to market size




We present a simple oligopoly model of charities providing differentiated services
and competing for donors. The model delivers testable predictions that allow us to
both contrast effects of market size in for-profit and charity markets and to discriminate
between alternative modes of competitive conduct in charitable markets depending
on whether charities pursue purely prosocial objectives or are also guided by non-
prosocial concerns.
We test the model’s predictions concerning the relationship between market size
and the size and number of providers in Canadian data for registered charities as well
as for for-profit entities. We analyze the association between markets size, and char-
ity size and the number of providers. Moreover, we study how fundraising efforts
correlate with market size. Finally, we compare the behavior of charities to that of
for-profits. Although the evidence we provide has limitations, taken together our find-
ings give reason to be sceptical of charities being purely driven by prosocial motives,
and are more consistent with a model of charities that are biased towards own pro-
duction. In this case, increased competition in larger markets can produce a beneficial
pro-competitive effect in charity markets, as it does in for-profit markets. The mecha-
nism underlying this effect is that larger markets already serve more varieties, making
it harder for a provider that is partially driven by prosocial motives to justify adding
new varieties at the expense of a decrease in the scale of provision of existing varieties.
This curbs the excessive entry that the bias towards own provision induces.
Besides providing and testing a model of competition for the third sector, a novel
undertaking as such, our results have direct policy implications. As more intense com-
petition can be counted on to improve economic performance in charity markets as
it does in for-profit markets, government policies may have a more important role to
play in smaller, “less competitive” charitable markets than they do in larger ones.
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Appendix A Heterogeneous Providers
Suppose that there is a mass N of providers differing with respect to their productivity;
specifically a provider with productivity φ faces marginal cost 1/φ.30 Provider productivity
types are distributed according to a Pareto distribution with a continuous support [1, ∞) and
with p.d.f. f (φ) = aφ−(1+a), a > 0. As before, preferences for differentiated varieties are of
the CES type. In what follows, we assume σ < 1 + a (which is necessary for the problem to be
well-defined).
In a equilibrium with free entry, if a for-profit provider with productivity φ′ is active (im-
plying that it makes non-negative profits), then all providers with productivity φ > φ will also
be active: with σ > 1 and a constant mark-up rate, revenues and thus gross profits are increas-
ing in φ, and so are net profits for a common fixed cost, F. So, if the marginal provider (the




f (φ) dφ = N (φ0)−a, (25)





Constrained utility maximization gives demands
x(φ) = K(λ) p(φ)−σ, (27)
where K(λ) ≡ ((σ− 1)/(λσ))σ, and where λ is the marginal utility of income. In a scenario






where ξ ≡ σ/(σ− 1); this results in revenues
r(φ) = p(φ), x(φ) = λ−σ ξ1−2σ φσ−1. (29)




f (φ) r(φ) dφ =
λ−σ ξ1−2σ a (φ0)σ−(1+a)
1 + a− σ . (30)
Equating (30) to total spend, M, solving for λ and replacing the solution into (29), we obtain an
30The mass of providers (N) can be thought of as resulting of forward-looking choices by potential
entrants (as in Hopenhayn, 1992). As we will show, predictions on size are independent of N, making
N irrelevant for the purposes of our discussion.
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expression for revenues of providers of productivity φ as a function of M:
r(φ) =
1 + a− σ
a
(M/N) (φ0)1+a−σ φσ−1. (31)
Equating the gross profits of the marginal firm, which equal to r(φ0)/σ, with F, solving for φ0,
and replacing the resulting expression into (25), we obtain
N =
1 + a− σ
a σF
M. (32)
This is linear in M and so changes in M leaves mean firm revenue (M/N) unchanged. An
analogous conclusion applies to an equilibrium under not-for-profit competition, which for µ =
0 coincides with the planning optimum (derivations in this case involve finding the optimal
level of provision for each active provider type φ, producing at marginal cost 1/φ, as a function
of φ0 and M, using this to find the welfare-maximizing φ0, and then substituting this into (25)).
As in the homogeneous-firm case, for N large, the decentralized outcome is efficient (Melitz
and Redding, 2014) – and so is firm size.
Thus, if the number of providers is sufficiently large (i.e. in a monopolistically-competitive
setting), market size has no effect on average provider size in either for-profit or not-for-profit
markets, independently of whether providers are homogeneous or heterogeneous. This means
that, whether or not providers are heterogeneous under these conditions, effects of market size
on provider size come solely from oligopolistically competitive responses.
Appendix B Charity Sectors
Our selection of charity sectors is driven mainly by practical reasons: we choose a represen-
tative set of service sectors among those that are well represented in the data. Table B.1 shows
the twenty most common sectors in the data in terms of the number of charities. By far the
most common type of charity is a religious organization. We do not consider those here as their
objective function may differ from the other charities and perhaps their main goal is not to pro-
vide such public services that the public sector would have an interest in providing. We focus
on six charity service sectors that are likely to benefit only local residents and provide public
services that could in principle be also provided by the public sector. Others among the top
ten most common ones we exclude are scholarships, youth services and concert halls. We ex-
clude concert halls as we include a similar group of festivals that is more common. We exclude
both scholarships and youth services as both seem to provide mainly scholarships and awards,
again not a typical public service. The sectors we focus on are Food and Clothing Banks, Day-
care centers, Housing charities, Senior Care, Disabled Care, and charities organizing Festivals
and Performances (boldfaced in the table). We have verified that the main results are similar in
the excluded four top_10 sectors to the six sectors we include in the analysis here. These results
are available from the authors.
Here we report more detailed information on the type of charities that operate in the six
sectors we analyze. We also describe how the number of charities in a market is related to mar-
ket size. In these descriptive statistics we have not applied the sample restriction concerning
dormant charities that we use in the regressions.
32
The charities in the Food and Cloth Bank sector seem almost always to be soup kitchens:
among the English names, many mention “food bank” in the name; among the French names,
“La Soupière” is common. If they engage in secondary activities, the most common type of
additional activity listed is “other low-income services”.
The Daycare sector charities, as far as we can tell, seem all to provide daycare services. The
typical names of these charities include “Daycare center”, “Daycare Society” or “Centre de la
Petite Enfance”. When they are involved in secondary activities, they most often list summer
camps.
The charities in our Housing sector seem to be somewhat more diverse. Based on their
names, some target their services to certain groups, such as the elderly or the poor. Among the
ones that have listed a secondary activities, common activities include food and cloth banks,
senior care, disabled care and legal assistance.
There is also some diversity in the Senior Care sector. While many of the names contain the
expressions “Senior club”, “Senior center” or “Senior société”, others include veterans’ associ-
ations or charities providing special physical equipment for the elderly. It seems that perhaps
even more actual elderly care homes are listed as housing charities rather than as senior care
charities. Among their secondary activities, by far the most common is disabled care; this
seems to be natural, because often elderly individuals can also be more-or-less disabled.
Among the actual Disabled Care sector, the most commonly listed secondary activities are
elderly care and housing. The names of the disabled care charities often reflect their target
group or disability, such as mental health, blindness, physical disabilities or autism.
The Festivals and Performances sector relates to music, dance and theatre groups as well as
related festivals. The listed secondary activities also relate to culture and music.
Tables B.2-B.7 show the number of firms tabulated by market size groups. The picture is
similar for all the sectors. The patterns is broadly consistent with the theory, as larger markets
have more charities on average. A striking difference with typical patterns for for-profit sectors
is that there are a number of quite large markets that do not have any entrants.
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Festivals, performing groups, musical ensembles 2,324 3.38
Services for the physically or mentally challenged 1,840 2.68
Scholarships, bursaries, awards 1,698 2.47
Seniors’ services 1,483 2.16
Food or clothing banks, soup kitchens, hostels 1,448 2.11
Housing 1,407 2.05
Children and youth services 1,369 1.99
Concert halls, etc. 1,324 1.93
Daycare 1,169 1.70
Hospitals 951 1.38
Public education, other study programs 884 1.29
Support of schools and education 870 1.27
Independent schools and boards 869 1.26
Historical sites, heritage societies 864 1.26
Youth groups 842 1.22
Specialized health organizations 831 1.21
Cemeteries 818 1.19
Other services for low-income persons 805 1.17
Total (including not listed) 68,740 100
Table B.2: Number of Charities by Market Size: Daycare
CSD Population N = 0 N = 1 N = 2 N = 3 N = 4 N = 5+ Total
< 500 2,241 6 0 0 0 0 2,247
500− 1, 000 906 29 0 0 0 0 935
1, 000− 5, 000 1,242 116 4 0 0 0 1,362
5, 000− 10, 000 246 51 12 0 0 0 309
10, 000− 50, 000 193 76 29 2 1 2 303
> 50, 000 14 16 25 11 6 25 97
Total 4,842 294 70 13 7 27 5,253
Table B.3: Number of Charities by Market Size: Food and Clothing Banks
CSD Population N = 0 N = 1 N = 2 N = 3 N = 4 N = 5+ Total
< 500 2,235 10 2 0 0 0 2,247
500− 1, 000 919 16 0 0 0 0 935
1, 000− 5, 000 1,195 150 15 2 0 0 1,362
5, 000− 10, 000 195 90 21 3 0 0 309
10, 000− 50, 000 129 96 43 24 7 4 303
> 50, 000 8 8 11 8 11 51 97
Total 4,681 370 92 37 18 55 5,253
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Table B.4: Number of Charities by Market Size: Housing
CSD Population N = 0 N = 1 N = 2 N = 3 N = 4 N = 5+ Total
< 500 2,238 7 2 0 0 0 2,247
500− 1, 000 892 42 1 0 0 0 935
1, 000− 5, 000 1,208 134 18 1 0 1 1362
5, 000− 10, 000 232 60 15 2 0 0 309
10, 000− 50, 000 163 84 31 16 3 6 303
> 50, 000 9 9 10 14 8 47 97
Total 4,742 336 77 33 11 54 5,253
Table B.5: Number of Charities by Market Size: Seniors
CSD Population N = 0 N = 1 N = 2 N = 3 N = 4 N = 5+ Total
< 500 2,177 67 2 1 0 0 2,247
500− 1, 000 856 68 10 1 0 0 935
1, 000− 5, 000 1,156 165 37 3 0 1 1,362
5, 000− 10, 000 210 80 15 4 0 0 309
10, 000− 50, 000 142 97 50 10 2 2 303
> 50, 000 10 16 20 15 8 28 97
Total 4,551 493 134 34 10 31 5,253
Table B.6: Number of Charities by Market Size: Disabled
CSD Population N = 0 N = 1 N = 2 N = 3 N = 4 N = 5+ Total
< 500 2,241 6 0 0 0 0 2,247
500− 1, 000 911 24 0 0 0 0 935
1, 000− 5, 000 1,225 116 16 3 1 1 1,362
5, 000− 10, 000 215 66 17 9 2 0 309
10, 000− 50, 000 137 76 39 24 13 14 303
> 50, 000 4 2 14 7 4 66 97
Total 4,733 290 86 43 20 81 5,253
Table B.7: Number of Charities by Market Size: Festivals and Performances
CSD Population N = 0 N = 1 N = 2 N = 3 N = 4 N = 5+ Total
< 500 2,225 21 1 0 0 0 2,247
500− 1, 000 912 20 3 0 0 0 935
1, 000− 5, 000 1,250 91 14 5 1 1 1,362
5, 000− 10, 000 230 53 17 6 3 0 309
10, 000− 50, 000 152 68 27 28 13 15 303
> 50, 000 4 13 7 3 6 64 97
Total 4,773 266 69 42 23 80 5,253
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Appendix C Market Definition
Given the information available in our data, we could define markets as municipalities (i.e.
CSD), Forward Sortation Areas (FSA), Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA) or Census Agglom-
erations (CA). In this appendix, we look at the question of which option is preferable.
FSAs are used in the Canadian postal system. In Canada, a postal code is an alphanumeric
six-character string that takes the form ‘A1A 1A1’. The FSA is a geographical area in which all
postal codes start with the same three characters (the ‘A1A’ part of the code). The first letter ‘A’
of the code stands for a postal district (most provinces/territories are assigned a unique postal
district – with the exception of Ontario and Quebec, which, due to their respective sizes, have
more (three for Ontario and five for Quebec); the cities of Toronto and Montreal each have their
own postal district (‘H’ for Montreal and ’M’ for Toronto). The digit is a variable that takes on a
value of zero for wide rural regions, and nonzero for urban areas. The second letter represents
a specific rural region, an entire medium-sized city, or a section of a major metropolitan area.
Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations are statistical units defined by
Statistics Canada. They comprise one or more municipalities (CSDs) that are closely integrated
together. Statistics Canada uses commuter flows to determine whether two or more cities are
closely integrated. CMAs must have a total population of at least 100,000, with at least 50,000
in the core municipality, while the core municipality of a CA must have a population of at least
10,000. In addition to rules based on commuter flows, CMAs and CAs are also defined in such
a way that they are spatially contiguous.
To determine what level of geographical disaggregation constitutes a market, we investi-
gate the bias caused by an inappropriate choice of market definition. The key characteristic
to consider here is whether a certain market definition implies a larger or smaller market than
another. In the case of CMAs and CAs, it is clear that they are larger than CSDs (or FSAs). In
the case of FSAs, however, they can be larger or smaller than CSDs, although typically they are
smaller. In rural areas, one FSA may include several municipalities. In urban areas, FSAs may
only correspond to a small part of a municipality.
In order to understand the bias that could arise from an incorrect market definition in our
estimation of the effects of market size on average provider size, consider an example economy.
In this economy, the real market is defined by zone A. However, suppose that we mistakenly
run our analysis using sub-zones of A as our markets: A1 and A2. Consider the case where
the population increases in A1 but not in A2. Assuming that there is a positive relationship
between market size and average charity size, average charity size will increase in both sub-
zones A1 and A2, because the underlying relationship is based on the “true market”, A. In this
case, we have no population increase in A2, yet a charity size increases in A2. Moreover, we
have a large relative population increase in A1, but a relatively smaller increase in the charity
size, than the real effect would imply. Both of these forces lead to a bias towards zero in our
estimation.
Consider now the opposite case, in which the “real” markets are zones A1 and A2, but in
which we estimate our regressions using the combined zone A that includes both A1 and A2.
If the population in A1 increases, so will charity size in market A1. Moreover, assume that
population size does not change in A2, then neither will average charity size in A2. As we
aggregate up these markets to A, we will see a moderate increase (i.e. both are smaller than in
A1 alone) in both population and average charity size in A. Therefore, using markets that are
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too large does not automatically lead to any bias as average response in A is correct (in a linear
world), even if it does lead to unnecessary imprecision.
Our claim therefore is that, for the purpose of studying our question, focusing on markets
that are too small can bias conclusions but using markets that are too large does not. To prove
this point, we run simple Monte Carlo simulations, using the Stata programs detailed in the
online supplementary material.
First, we assume that our units of observation are too small, so that many of our data points
are actually in the same market. This simulation would correspond to the case where real
markets are CSDs but instead we conduct our analysis at the FSA level. In this simulation we
find that the elasticity of average expenditures to market size is under-estimated. With a real
value of 0.25, our average estimate is 0.088 (with a standard deviation of 0.0073). In all 1,000
repetitions, we can reject the null hypothesis that our estimate is equal to 0.25.
Second, we assume that our units of observation are too large and include more than one
real market. This would correspond to the case where real markets are CSDs but we conduct
the analysis at the CMA/CA level. In this simulation we find an estimate of the elasticity of
average expenditures to market size about equal to the true value of 0.25: our estimate is equal
to 0.26 with a standard deviation of 0.05. In only 115 of 1,000 repetitions, we can reject the null
hypothesis that our estimate is equal to 0.25.
In addition to carrying out these simulations, we conduct our main analysis at three differ-
ent geography levels: FSA, CSD, and CMA/CA. Table C.1 presents our results for the pooled
OLS models. We find that the results are consistent with CSDs being the real markets (at least
a good approximation). Indeed, in five of six charitable sectors, the elasticity of charity size
with respect to market size is lower at the FSA level than at the CSD level. In four sectors, the
estimates are similar at the CSD and CMA level. CMA results are less precise in many cases
as the sample size is also smaller. Assuming CSDs are the relevant markets, we would expect
an analysis at the FSA level to find lower estimates, since FSAs are often smaller than CSDs.
We would also expect an analysis at the CMA/CA level to find estimates similar to those with
CSDs, since CMAs and CAs are strictly larger than CSDs. This is indeed the case, and thus we
are confident that CSD is preferable unit of analysis in our case amongst those available.
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Table C.1: Association between Market Population (in log) and Average Expenditures (in log), Across
Market Definitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FSA CSD CMA
All Six Sectors 0.052* 0.059 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.23***
(0.030) (0.037) (0.014) (0.019) (0.028) (0.051)
N 8946 6363 5521 5338 1470 1469
R2 0.024 0.065 0.113 0.122 0.116 0.136
Daycare 0.028 0.016 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.29***
(0.036) (0.055) (0.023) (0.032) (0.046) (0.071)
N 1945 1435 1214 1171 315 314
R2 0.124 0.117 0.259 0.311 0.217 0.299
Food and Clothing Banks -0.038 0.072 0.24*** 0.35*** 0.30*** 0.097
(0.077) (0.087) (0.036) (0.042) (0.049) (0.071)
N 1116 783 635 614 204 204
R2 0.043 0.240 0.232 0.295 0.322 0.436
Housing 0.079 0.0011 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.26*** 0.19*
(0.072) (0.076) (0.027) (0.042) (0.051) (0.11)
N 1767 1291 1208 1161 289 289
R2 0.023 0.108 0.160 0.191 0.135 0.283
Seniors 0.24*** 0.32*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.35*** 0.41***
(0.089) (0.11) (0.033) (0.049) (0.077) (0.16)
N 1250 892 755 733 198 198
R2 0.040 0.100 0.094 0.102 0.160 0.249
Disabled 0.12* 0.086 0.35*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.16
(0.064) (0.080) (0.033) (0.051) (0.062) (0.11)
N 1819 1263 1181 1154 306 306
R2 0.021 0.121 0.190 0.270 0.131 0.267
Festivals and Performances -0.18*** 0.031 0.15*** 0.22*** 0.45*** 0.41***
(0.065) (0.087) (0.038) (0.049) (0.065) (0.097)
N 1049 699 528 505 158 158
R2 0.027 0.188 0.075 0.129 0.323 0.385
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(average expenditures). The table shows the coefficients on ln(population), with
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. All models include year fixed effects.
Models with control variables also include: log of mean household income, share of population over
65 years old, share of population under 5 years old, share without a high school diploma, share with
university degree, share of immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Appendix D Data Sources
We conduct our analysis at the market level, with markets defined as municipalities (a gen-
eral term encompassing towns, cities, villages, etc.). In Canadian statistics, municipalities are
known as Census sub-divisions (CSD). The borders of these CSDs are re-defined (usually in
Census years) according to the evolution of administrative boundaries, due, for example, to
municipal mergers and secessions. This feature makes it particularly hard to study municipal-
ities in panel data. To keep the definition of a market constant, we define markets using the
borders of CSDs in 2011, and adjust data from prior years accordingly using GIS software.
For the analysis, we use three main sources of data. For data on charities, we use admin-
istrative data on charities from the Canadian Revenue Agency (form T3010). For data on all
businesses, we use administrative data on businesses by industry from the Canadian Business
Register, maintained by Statistics Canada. Finally, for socio-economic and control variables,
we use the Community Profiles from the 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2011 Censuses, administered by
Statistics Canada.
D.1 Charities
Each year, charities have to fill out a form (T3010) about their activities and submit it to the
Canadian Revenue Agency. We use the data from these forms at the individual charity level.
We restrict our attention to years closest to the ones in which we also have Census data (so
1997, 2001, 2005, 2011).
First, we need to assign these charities to a market (i.e., 2011 CSD). From 1997 to 2005, the
data is geo-coded. Using the latitude and longitude of every charity, we map the charities
location on the map of Canada, and find the code of the CSD in which they are situated. For
2011 data, the charities are not geo-coded. We do, however, have the street address, postal
code, city, province, and BN code (unique identifier). As a first step, we use the combination
of town name and province to assign each charity to a CSD. This step assigns a CSD to 64,573
charities.
Many charities make mistakes on the T3010 forms, or list their address as some smaller
village or neighbourhood that is only part of the bigger (official) municipality. To match the rest
of the charities, we assign them to CSDs using the BN code and the assigned CSD of the same
charity in the previous data (2007). Doing so assigns a CSD to an additional 18,145 charities.
Finally, if these steps do not result in finding a location, we assign a CSD code using the postal
code. Doing so requires knowing where postal codes lie on the map of CSDs. We use a crowd-
sourced shapefile of postal codes available from geocoder.ca, and overlap it with the shapefile
of 2011 CSDs, assigning each postal code to a CSD using the centroid of postal code geometries.
Since these postal code geometries sometimes cross CSD boundaries, they only imperfectly
capture the city of operation of the charity. Nevertheless, we are able to assign a market to an
additional 3,657 charities using this method.
D.2 Business Register
Every business in Canada is assigned a Business Number (BN), and is included in the Cana-
dian Business Register (BR), maintained by Statistics Canada. Note that this register also in-
cludes the charities. We have simple data from the BR from 2007 to 2011: number of firms
by Dissemination Area (small statistical area of 400 to 700 population) and by 6-digit NAICS
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industry. We aggregate Dissemination Area at the level of Census Subdivisions using GIS soft-
ware and boundary files. The number of firms is disaggregated by employment size category
(1 to 4 employees, 5 to 9, 10 to 19, 20 to 49, 50 to 99, 100 to 199, 200 to 499, and 500 or more).
Some firms are categorized as of “indeterminate” size: these could be firms where the owner
is the only worker, or where the family are employees, for example. Some firms are uncatego-
rized in terms of geography: they are included in the provincial “residue”. We cannot assign
them to a CSD. To measure average firm size, we use the mid-point of each size category, times
the number of firms in that category. We do not count firms of indeterminate size. We thus
obtain average firm size by NAICS industry and by 2011 municipality.
D.3 Census
The final data source is the Canadian Census. Specifically, we use the Community Profiles
from the 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2011 Census.31 These profiles are available for different geo-
graphical units, but we use the CSD level, available in all years. The borders of the CSDs are
not stable through the whole period, so we need to adjust the data. To do so, we use the CSD
shapefiles for years 1996, 2001, and 2006, and find the centroids of the CSDs. We overlap the
centroids32 on the shapefile for 2011 CSDs, and assign each CSD of prior years to a 2011 CSD.
This gives us a correspondence file for CSDt to CSD2011. The geometry of some CSDs contains
errors. In those cases, we do not find the centroid, so we manually add the correspondence of
those CSDs to 2011 CSDs, by looking at the geographic maps.
We then take the whole dataset of CSD Community Profiles for each year, and collapse the
data to the level of 2011 CSD. For non-count data (i.e., average income), we use the population-
weighted averages across CSDs. We then obtain a panel of Community Profiles from 1996 to
2011 using relatively stable geographic definitions.
31The 2011 Census only includes basic information such as population. In 2011, the Census was in-
stead complemented by a National Household Survey, to which response was optional. For that reason,
the 2011 Census suffered from more data suppression.
32We use the realcentroids plugin in QGIS to adjust centroids to be inside borders only.
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Appendix E Correspondence Between NAICS Codes and Charity Sectors
NAICS 2007 code Description
Daycare
624410 Child Day Care Services
Festivals and Performances
711311 Live theatres and other performing arts presenters with facilities
711321 Performing arts promoters (presenters) without facilities
711322 Festivals without facilities
711511 Independent Artists, Visual Arts
711512 Independent Actors, Comedians and Performers
711111 Theatre (except musical) companies
711112 Musical theatre and opera companies
711120 Dance companies
711130 Musical groups and artists
711190 Other performing arts companies
Housing
531111 Lessors of residential buildings and dwellings (except social housing
projects)
531112 Lessors of social housing projects
Seniors and Disabled Care (combined)
624120 Services for the elderly and persons with disabilities
624310 Vocational rehabilitation services
Food and Clothing Banks
624210 Community food services
722330 Mobile food services
722210 Limited-Service Eating Places
722310 Food Service Contractors
445110 Supermarkets and Other Grocery (except Convenience) Stores
445120 Convenience Stores
448110 Men’s Clothing Stores
448120 Women’s Clothing Stores
448130 Children’s and Infants’ Clothing Stores
448140 Family Clothing Stores
448150 Clothing Accessories Stores
448199 All Other Clothing Stores
448210 Shoe Stores
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Appendix F Additional Tables (Online Appendix, not for publication)
Table F.1: Descriptive Statistics on control variables for 2011
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Population 5,253 6,372.9 55,583.9 0 2,615,060
Household Mean Income 2,831 54,760.6 18,082.1 10,733 181,454
Share over 65 (%) 4,556 16.6 7.85 0 93.7
Share under 5 (%) 4,556 5.79 3.07 0 22.4
Share w/o high school (%) 3,439 32.4 16.5 0 100
Share university-educated (%) 3,439 8.82 8.42 0 71.4
Share of immigrants (%) 2,881 4.53 6.78 0 59.6
Unemployment rate (%) 3,439 11.2 11.9 0 100
Average gross rent 2,225 653.3 213.4 154 2,148
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Table F.2: Association Between Market Population (in log), and Average Employment (in log) and the
Number of Providers (in log), Charities only vs. Business Register (with Fixed Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Average Employment Number of Providers
All Six Sectors
Charities 0.069 0.00022 0.27 0.33
(0.52) (0.66) (0.21) (0.27)
Business Register -0.46** -0.16 0.055 -0.12
(0.21) (0.27) (0.24) (0.31)
t-test (p-value) 0.342 0.823 0.499 0.284
Daycare
Charities 0.30 -0.79 -0.31 -0.22
(0.65) (0.87) (0.24) (0.39)
Business Register -0.50 -0.99 0.42 0.81*
(0.57) (1.03) (0.32) (0.46)
t-test (p-value) 0.392 0.901 0.056 0.066
Festivals
Charities 1.19 0.31 -0.42 -0.71
(3.30) (4.35) (0.81) (1.16)
Business Register 0.83 2.69* -0.030 -0.41
(1.36) (1.42) (0.79) (1.12)
t-test (p-value) 0.901 0.480 0.740 0.859
Housing
Charities 0.032 -1.62** 0.50 0.098
(0.69) (0.81) (0.45) (0.53)
Business Register -0.064 0.52 1.16 1.24*
(0.70) (0.82) (0.68) (0.70)
t-test (p-value) 0.909 0.019 0.361 0.194
Seniors and Disabled
Charities 0.41 0.86 -0.33 -0.36
(0.92) (1.32) (0.47) (0.70)
Business Register 0.058 0.59 0.47 0.51
(0.66) (0.88) (0.37) (0.42)
t-test (p-value) 0.757 0.846 0.224 0.331
Food and clothing
Charities 0.86 0.81 -0.15 -0.56*
(0.80) (1.07) (0.17) (0.32)
Business Register -0.47 0.68 0.078 0.037
(0.48) (0.50) (0.51) (0.60)
t-test (p-value) 0.093 0.912 0.678 0.376
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcomes are ln(average employment) and ln(number of providers). The table shows the co-
efficients on ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. Tests
are for the equality of the coefficients across datasets, combined using suest in Stata. All models
include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of mean household in-
come, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under 5 years old, share without a
high school diploma, share with university degree, share of immigrants, unemployment rate, log of
average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table F.3: Association between Market Population (in log), and Average Employment (in log) and the
Number of Providers (in log), Using Business Register Data Only, for the Housing Sector (Pooled OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Average Employment Number of Providers
NAICS 531111 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.86*** 0.77***
Lessors of Residential Buildings Excl. Social
Housing
(0.020) (0.030) (0.029) (0.035)
NAICS 531112 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.42*** 0.43***
Lessor of Social Housing Projects (0.031) (0.040) (0.032) (0.035)
t-test (p-value) 0.007 0.012 0.000 0.000
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcomes are ln(average employment) and ln(number of providers). The table shows the co-
efficients on ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. Tests
are for the equality of the coefficients across regressions, combined using suest in Stata. All models
include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of mean household in-
come, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under 5 years old, share without a
high school diploma, share with university degree, share of immigrants, unemployment rate, log of
average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
44
Table F.4: Association Between Market Population (in log) and Average Revenues (in log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.041 0.0018
(0.014) (0.019) (0.11) (0.13)
N 5512 5331 5512 5331
R2 0.113 0.122 0.061 0.029
Daycare 0.24*** 0.25*** -0.014 -0.0088
(0.024) (0.033) (0.19) (0.20)
N 1212 1170 1212 1170
R2 0.256 0.299 0.098 0.091
Food and Clothing Banks 0.25*** 0.35*** 0.73*** 0.71**
(0.039) (0.043) (0.26) (0.35)
N 634 613 634 613
R2 0.225 0.282 0.203 0.197
Housing 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.13 -0.043
(0.027) (0.041) (0.11) (0.11)
N 1205 1158 1205 1158
R2 0.165 0.200 0.150 0.028
Seniors 0.22*** 0.25*** -0.13 -0.028
(0.033) (0.049) (0.32) (0.50)
N 753 731 753 731
R2 0.096 0.105 0.015 0.001
Disabled 0.35*** 0.29*** 0.036 -0.19
(0.033) (0.050) (0.16) (0.22)
N 1181 1154 1181 1154
R2 0.185 0.263 0.072 0.000
Festivals and Performances 0.14*** 0.22*** 0.15 0.53
(0.038) (0.050) (0.34) (0.44)
N 527 505 527 505
R2 0.069 0.126 0.068 0.062
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(average revenues). The table shows the coefficients on
ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. All mod-
els include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of mean
household income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under 5
years old, share without a high school diploma, share with university degree, share of
immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table F.5: Association Between Market Population (in log) and Average Expenditures (in log),
with Markets Defined by Relevant Sub-Population, for Selection of Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Daycare
ln(population under 5) 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.038 0.100
(0.023) (0.031) (0.10) (0.11)
N 1213 1171 1213 1171
R2 0.259 0.311 0.160 0.191
Seniors
ln(population over 65) 0.22*** 0.25*** -0.011 0.095
(0.035) (0.048) (0.15) (0.24)
N 755 733 755 733
R2 0.096 0.107 0.009 0.051
Disabled
ln(population over 65) 0.38*** 0.28*** -0.24 -0.18
(0.035) (0.049) (0.15) (0.16)
N 1178 1154 1178 1154
R2 0.196 0.271 0.018 0.007
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(average expenditures). The table shows the coefficients on
ln(relevant sub-population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market
level. All models include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include:
log of mean household income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population
under 5 years old, share without a high school diploma, share with university degree,
share of immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table F.6: Association between Market Population (in log) and the Number of Providers (in
log), with Markets Defined by Relevant Sub-Population, for Selection of Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Daycare
ln(population under 5) 0.29*** 0.34*** -0.030 -0.058
(0.029) (0.033) (0.043) (0.050)
N 1502 1446 1502 1446
R2 0.456 0.545 0.326 0.305
Seniors
ln(population over 65) 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.12* 0.18**
(0.029) (0.030) (0.065) (0.074)
N 1453 1397 1453 1397
R2 0.386 0.447 0.380 0.390
Disabled
ln(population over 65) 0.41*** 0.47*** 0.13** 0.083
(0.025) (0.025) (0.064) (0.075)
N 1737 1698 1737 1698
R2 0.560 0.616 0.543 0.445
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(number of providers). The table shows the coefficients on ln(relevant
sub-population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. All
models include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of mean
household income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under 5
years old, share without a high school diploma, share with university degree, share of
immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table F.7: Association Between Market Population (in log) and Average Expenditures (in log),
Including Charities with Low Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.010 -0.087
(0.012) (0.016) (0.099) (0.11)
N 8937 8630 8937 8630
R2 0.070 0.076 0.022 0.002
Daycare 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.11 0.054
(0.021) (0.029) (0.13) (0.16)
N 1505 1447 1505 1447
R2 0.273 0.317 0.229 0.155
Food and Clothing Banks 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.47* 0.38
(0.027) (0.032) (0.24) (0.28)
N 1299 1265 1299 1265
R2 0.140 0.189 0.135 0.139
Housing 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.023 -0.18
(0.025) (0.037) (0.16) (0.17)
N 1748 1678 1748 1678
R2 0.138 0.181 0.036 0.013
Seniors 0.20*** 0.25*** -0.20 -0.078
(0.025) (0.037) (0.23) (0.28)
N 1455 1397 1455 1397
R2 0.083 0.098 0.032 0.008
Disabled 0.34*** 0.25*** -0.013 -0.095
(0.030) (0.044) (0.17) (0.22)
N 1742 1698 1742 1698
R2 0.164 0.252 0.030 0.001
Festivals and Performances 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.040 0.0081
(0.032) (0.039) (0.23) (0.27)
N 1188 1145 1188 1145
R2 0.041 0.101 0.029 0.004
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(average expenditures). The table shows the coefficients on
ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. This
regression includes all charities, even those with expenditures lower than CDN $30,000.
All models include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of
mean household income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under
5 years old, share without a high school diploma, share with university degree, share of
immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table F.8: Association Between Market Population (in log) and Average Expenditures (in log),
Excluding Top and Bottom 5% of Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.095 -0.036
(0.019) (0.023) (0.12) (0.14)
N 4990 4884 4990 4884
R2 0.081 0.091 0.068 0.032
Daycare 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.14 0.17
(0.031) (0.038) (0.16) (0.17)
N 1107 1076 1107 1076
R2 0.227 0.294 0.215 0.169
Food and Clothing Banks 0.25*** 0.34*** 0.54 0.33
(0.043) (0.049) (0.36) (0.36)
N 571 562 571 562
R2 0.194 0.237 0.182 0.126
Housing 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.17 0.018
(0.040) (0.052) (0.11) (0.12)
N 1084 1055 1084 1055
R2 0.139 0.177 0.132 0.052
Seniors 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.23 0.0072
(0.044) (0.058) (0.42) (0.50)
N 696 683 696 683
R2 0.057 0.063 0.054 0.025
Disabled 0.37*** 0.28*** -0.12 -0.36*
(0.050) (0.066) (0.19) (0.20)
N 1060 1047 1060 1047
R2 0.142 0.225 0.008 0.005
Festivals and Performances 0.063 0.13** 0.57 0.65
(0.051) (0.058) (0.38) (0.47)
N 464 455 464 455
R2 0.026 0.061 0.011 0.006
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(average expenditures). The table shows the coefficients on
ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. This
regression excludes markets at the top and bottom 5% of the distribution of population.
All models include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of
mean household income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under
5 years old, share without a high school diploma, share with university degree, share of
immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table F.9: Association between Market Population (in log) and the Number of Providers (in
log), Excluding Top and Bottom 5% of Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.29*** 0.32*** 0.071** 0.066*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.034) (0.037)
N 7857 7722 7857 7722
R2 0.371 0.415 0.336 0.310
Daycare 0.22*** 0.23*** -0.073 -0.11
(0.020) (0.026) (0.081) (0.088)
N 1355 1317 1355 1317
R2 0.336 0.373 0.294 0.257
Food and Clothing Banks 0.28*** 0.34*** 0.10 0.12
(0.021) (0.022) (0.10) (0.13)
N 1170 1155 1170 1155
R2 0.390 0.491 0.318 0.339
Housing 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.12* 0.15**
(0.017) (0.022) (0.070) (0.068)
N 1574 1528 1574 1528
R2 0.374 0.415 0.365 0.312
Seniors 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.17 0.16
(0.016) (0.021) (0.11) (0.13)
N 1311 1278 1311 1278
R2 0.206 0.241 0.204 0.177
Disabled 0.34*** 0.41*** 0.11 0.14
(0.020) (0.023) (0.088) (0.10)
N 1568 1545 1568 1545
R2 0.422 0.495 0.394 0.405
Festivals and Performances 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.23*** 0.23**
(0.025) (0.029) (0.089) (0.092)
N 1070 1054 1070 1054
R2 0.439 0.494 0.428 0.435
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(number of providers). The table shows the coefficients on
ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. This
regression excludes markets at the top and bottom 5% of the distribution of population.
All models include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of
mean household income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under
5 years old, share without a high school diploma, share with university degree, share of
immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table F.10: Association between Market Size (in log) and Total Expenditures (in log), at Indi-
vidual Producer Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.11*** 0.094*** -0.24** -0.35***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.10) (0.12)
N 18850 18657 18850 18657
R2 0.046 0.055 0.011 0.010
Daycare 0.085*** 0.079* 0.071 0.021
(0.026) (0.045) (0.15) (0.18)
N 3492 3447 3492 3447
R2 0.137 0.163 0.136 0.072
Food and Clothing Banks 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.42 0.89***
(0.019) (0.038) (0.29) (0.30)
N 2034 2011 2034 2011
R2 0.190 0.203 0.183 0.146
Housing 0.15*** 0.12*** -0.12 -0.36*
(0.036) (0.033) (0.18) (0.20)
N 3568 3521 3568 3521
R2 0.079 0.110 0.023 0.031
Seniors 0.12** 0.10*** -0.56** -0.70**
(0.049) (0.035) (0.26) (0.34)
N 2121 2097 2121 2097
R2 0.057 0.080 0.034 0.035
Disabled 0.098** 0.074* -0.50*** -0.78***
(0.044) (0.038) (0.19) (0.22)
N 4143 4115 4143 4115
R2 0.033 0.097 0.009 0.006
Festivals and Performances 0.15*** 0.21*** -0.12 -0.065
(0.024) (0.029) (0.28) (0.29)
N 3492 3466 3492 3466
R2 0.057 0.081 0.029 0.000
Producer Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(total expenditures). These regressions are conducted with in-
dividual producers as the units of observation. The table shows the coefficients on
ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. All mod-
els include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of mean
household income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under 5
years old, share without a high school diploma, share with university degree, share of
immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
51
Table F.11: Association Between Market Population (in log) and Average Expenditures (in
log), Controlling for the Average Share of Revenues from Government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.089 0.087
(0.014) (0.019) (0.12) (0.13)
N 4151 4083 4151 4083
R2 0.116 0.122 0.091 0.088
Daycare 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.086 0.16
(0.025) (0.031) (0.17) (0.17)
N 903 894 903 894
R2 0.242 0.288 0.182 0.120
Food and Clothing Banks 0.24*** 0.33*** 0.26 0.0097
(0.036) (0.043) (0.40) (0.48)
N 460 447 460 447
R2 0.248 0.318 0.180 0.042
Housing 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.13 -0.027
(0.028) (0.043) (0.11) (0.13)
N 909 891 909 891
R2 0.169 0.190 0.014 0.006
Seniors 0.26*** 0.23*** -0.28 -0.11
(0.036) (0.049) (0.26) (0.47)
N 568 560 568 560
R2 0.144 0.151 0.077 0.029
Disabled 0.37*** 0.28*** 0.078 -0.21
(0.033) (0.052) (0.21) (0.23)
N 890 883 890 883
R2 0.188 0.271 0.099 0.000
Festivals and Performances 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.28 1.01**
(0.038) (0.051) (0.39) (0.40)
N 421 408 421 408
R2 0.112 0.150 0.098 0.089
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(average expenditures). The table shows the coefficients on
ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. All mod-
els include year fixed effects and control for the average share of government funding in
charities’ revenues. Models with control variables also include: log of mean household
income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under 5 years old,
share without a high school diploma, share with university degree, share of immigrants,
unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table F.12: Association Between Market Population (in log) and the Number of Providers (in
log), Controlling for the Average Share of Revenues from Government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.34*** 0.38*** 0.085 0.097*
(0.027) (0.025) (0.053) (0.058)
N 4151 4083 4151 4083
R2 0.497 0.584 0.471 0.518
Daycare 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.072 0.025
(0.035) (0.038) (0.075) (0.080)
N 903 894 903 894
R2 0.460 0.536 0.440 0.269
Food and Clothing Banks 0.32*** 0.42*** 0.33** 0.48**
(0.036) (0.038) (0.14) (0.20)
N 460 447 460 447
R2 0.496 0.643 0.489 0.549
Housing 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.14** 0.15***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.059) (0.055)
N 909 891 909 891
R2 0.512 0.601 0.083 0.103
Seniors 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.040 0.089
(0.050) (0.050) (0.10) (0.19)
N 568 560 568 560
R2 0.382 0.494 0.229 0.322
Disabled 0.41*** 0.48*** -0.026 -0.050
(0.027) (0.025) (0.099) (0.10)
N 890 883 890 883
R2 0.601 0.691 0.116 0.055
Festivals and Performances 0.45*** 0.47*** 0.27 0.48**
(0.050) (0.042) (0.17) (0.22)
N 421 408 421 408
R2 0.583 0.696 0.577 0.622
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(number of providers). The table shows the coefficients on
ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. All mod-
els include year fixed effects and control for the average share of government funding in
charities’ revenues. Models with control variables also include: log of mean household
income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under 5 years old,
share without a high school diploma, share with university degree, share of immigrants,
unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table F.13: Association Between Market Population (in log) and Median Expenditures (in log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.13*** 0.14*** -0.037 -0.061
(0.013) (0.019) (0.12) (0.13)
N 5521 5338 5521 5338
R2 0.063 0.074 0.018 0.014
Daycare 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.055 0.082
(0.022) (0.031) (0.17) (0.17)
N 1214 1171 1214 1171
R2 0.216 0.282 0.172 0.166
Food and Clothing Banks 0.19*** 0.28*** 0.35 0.27
(0.033) (0.040) (0.26) (0.29)
N 635 614 635 614
R2 0.182 0.231 0.175 0.133
Housing 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.054 -0.11
(0.027) (0.041) (0.13) (0.12)
N 1208 1161 1208 1161
R2 0.097 0.134 0.069 0.000
Seniors 0.13*** 0.15*** -0.13 -0.065
(0.030) (0.048) (0.29) (0.48)
N 755 733 755 733
R2 0.049 0.057 0.001 0.003
Disabled 0.16*** 0.059 -0.16 -0.33
(0.034) (0.049) (0.17) (0.22)
N 1181 1154 1181 1154
R2 0.082 0.199 0.004 0.002
Festivals and Performances 0.032 0.099** 0.24 0.68
(0.030) (0.046) (0.36) (0.42)
N 528 505 528 505
R2 0.020 0.051 0.009 0.008
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(median expenditures). The table shows the coefficients on
ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. All mod-
els include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of mean
household income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under 5
years old, share without a high school diploma, share with university degree, share of
immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table F.14: Association Between Market Population (in log) and Average Expenditures (in
log), with Province and Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.20*** 0.22*** -0.0077 -0.053
(0.015) (0.019) (0.11) (0.13)
N 5521 5338 5521 5338
R2 0.133 0.142 0.027 0.011
Daycare 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.043 0.053
(0.023) (0.028) (0.17) (0.18)
N 1214 1171 1214 1171
R2 0.460 0.480 0.165 0.143
Food and Clothing Banks 0.26*** 0.41*** 0.42 0.25
(0.035) (0.044) (0.26) (0.29)
N 635 614 635 614
R2 0.289 0.371 0.227 0.165
Housing 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.063 -0.088
(0.028) (0.042) (0.12) (0.12)
N 1208 1161 1208 1161
R2 0.261 0.267 0.101 0.000
Seniors 0.16*** 0.20*** -0.10 -0.091
(0.036) (0.050) (0.28) (0.47)
N 755 733 755 733
R2 0.168 0.174 0.004 0.001
Disabled 0.28*** 0.25*** -0.038 -0.24
(0.032) (0.045) (0.15) (0.19)
N 1181 1154 1181 1154
R2 0.376 0.393 0.021 0.000
Festivals and Performances 0.13*** 0.21*** 0.28 0.73*
(0.044) (0.053) (0.36) (0.42)
N 528 505 528 505
R2 0.099 0.169 0.072 0.077
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(average expenditures). The table shows the coefficients on
ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. Models
with control variables also include: log of mean household income, share of population
over 65 years old, share of population under 5 years old, share without a high school
diploma, share with university degree, share of immigrants, unemployment rate, log of
average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table F.15: Association Between Market Population (in log) and Average Expenditures (in
log), with Province, Year, and Province×Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.20*** 0.22*** -0.063 -0.066
(0.015) (0.019) (0.11) (0.13)
N 5521 5338 5521 5338
R2 0.137 0.147 0.003 0.003
Daycare 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.0063 0.084
(0.023) (0.028) (0.14) (0.14)
N 1214 1171 1214 1171
R2 0.486 0.509 0.238 0.283
Food and Clothing Banks 0.26*** 0.42*** 0.63** 0.36
(0.035) (0.044) (0.30) (0.31)
N 635 614 635 614
R2 0.306 0.399 0.228 0.218
Housing 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.068 0.011
(0.029) (0.043) (0.12) (0.12)
N 1208 1161 1208 1161
R2 0.271 0.277 0.073 0.009
Seniors 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.046 -0.27
(0.037) (0.051) (0.29) (0.48)
N 755 733 755 733
R2 0.203 0.210 0.066 0.002
Disabled 0.28*** 0.25*** -0.24 -0.31
(0.032) (0.046) (0.15) (0.19)
N 1181 1154 1181 1154
R2 0.385 0.405 0.002 0.000
Festivals and Performances 0.13** 0.20*** 0.52 1.04**
(0.045) (0.055) (0.38) (0.50)
N 528 505 528 505
R2 0.119 0.188 0.069 0.076
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(average expenditures). The table shows the coefficients on
ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. Models
with control variables also include: log of mean household income, share of population
over 65 years old, share of population under 5 years old, share without a high school
diploma, share with university degree, share of immigrants, unemployment rate, log of
average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
56
Table F.16: Association Between Market Population (in log) and Average Expenditures (in
log), Only Local Charities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.20*** 0.21*** -0.086 -0.11
(0.014) (0.019) (0.14) (0.16)
N 4001 3946 4001 3946
R2 0.088 0.099 0.002 0.004
Daycare 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.089 0.19
(0.023) (0.031) (0.15) (0.14)
N 902 893 902 893
R2 0.208 0.266 0.168 0.073
Food and Clothing Banks 0.20*** 0.26*** 0.61 0.31
(0.035) (0.049) (0.46) (0.44)
N 464 453 464 453
R2 0.182 0.241 0.156 0.132
Housing 0.27*** 0.31*** -0.042 -0.26
(0.028) (0.041) (0.24) (0.27)
N 869 854 869 854
R2 0.151 0.195 0.024 0.039
Seniors 0.16*** 0.16*** -0.42 -0.43
(0.033) (0.054) (0.31) (0.75)
N 569 566 569 566
R2 0.058 0.074 0.040 0.006
Disabled 0.35*** 0.26*** -0.041 -0.30
(0.036) (0.055) (0.26) (0.27)
N 821 815 821 815
R2 0.173 0.270 0.004 0.005
Festivals and Performances 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.068 1.01*
(0.038) (0.050) (0.47) (0.60)
N 376 365 376 365
R2 0.048 0.090 0.044 0.049
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(average expenditures). These regressions only include local char-
ities, i.e., those that reported being active only in their local municipality. We omit
2011 data in which this information is unavailable. The table shows the coefficients on
ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. All mod-
els include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of mean
household income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under 5
years old, share without a high school diploma, share with university degree, share of
immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table F.17: Association Between Market Population (in log) and the Number of Providers (in
log), Only Local Charities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Six Sectors 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.021 0.023
(0.024) (0.022) (0.038) (0.043)
N 6146 6059 6146 6059
R2 0.461 0.545 0.343 0.266
Daycare 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.029 -0.00034
(0.031) (0.034) (0.068) (0.078)
N 1082 1070 1082 1070
R2 0.461 0.542 0.340 0.100
Food and Clothing Banks 0.30*** 0.37*** 0.31** 0.34**
(0.029) (0.028) (0.13) (0.16)
N 863 849 863 849
R2 0.459 0.590 0.459 0.502
Housing 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.0021 0.018
(0.023) (0.026) (0.070) (0.074)
N 1229 1207 1229 1207
R2 0.476 0.554 0.008 0.007
Seniors 0.24*** 0.28*** -0.019 0.013
(0.029) (0.032) (0.087) (0.13)
N 1001 989 1001 989
R2 0.377 0.461 0.240 0.014
Disabled 0.34*** 0.44*** -0.17 -0.075
(0.023) (0.024) (0.11) (0.11)
N 1213 1202 1213 1202
R2 0.518 0.613 0.511 0.325
Festivals and Performances 0.39*** 0.42*** 0.15* 0.17
(0.036) (0.029) (0.089) (0.15)
N 758 742 758 742
R2 0.516 0.629 0.509 0.473
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The outcome is ln(number of providers). These regressions only include local char-
ities, i.e., those that reported being active only in their local municipality. We omit
2011 data in which this information is unavailable. The table shows the coefficients on
ln(population), with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the market level. All mod-
els include year fixed effects. Models with control variables also include: log of mean
household income, share of population over 65 years old, share of population under 5
years old, share without a high school diploma, share with university degree, share of
immigrants, unemployment rate, log of average rental price.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Appendix G Monte Carlo Simulation Code (Not for Publication)
Stata Code 1: Monte Carlo Simulation: Units of Observation are too small
clear
postfile simuls beta var n rej using simulsfile_toosmall , replace
quietly forvalues i=1/1000 {
clear
* Create a dataset of sub -markets
* (unit of observation in hypothetical regression)
set obs 10000
gen pop = runiformint (50 ,125000)
* Merger them in real markets
gen id = _n
gen market = round(id ,2)
* Calculate population of market
bysort market: egen popmarket = total(pop)
gen logpopmarket=log(popmarket)
* Calculate average expenditure in market , with noise
gen logavgexp_market = 10 + 0.25* log(popmarket)
gen avgexp_market = exp(logavgexp_market) + 200000* rnormal ()
* Sub -markets all have the same charity size
* since that variable is defined at the market level only
gen logavgexp=log(avgexp_market)
gen logpop = log(pop)
* Regression at sub -market level





gen rej = r(p)
post simuls (b[1,1]) (v[1 ,1]) (e(N)) (rej)
}
else {






Stata Code 2: Monte Carlo Simulation: Units of observation are too large
clear
postfile simuls beta var n rej using simulsfile_toolarge , replace
quietly forvalues i=1/1000 {
clear
* Create a dataset of real markets
set obs 1000
gen pop = runiformint (100 ,250000)
* Calculate average expenditure in the market , add noise
gen logavgexp = 10 + 0.25* log(pop)
gen avgexp = exp(logavgexp) + 200000* rnormal ()
* Arrange them in groups , our units of observation
* (each group includes 2 markets)
gen id = _n
gen group = round(id ,2)
* Calculate population and average expenditure at the group level
collapse (rawsum) pop (mean) avgexp [w=pop], by(group)
* Regressions at group level
gen logpop=log(pop)
gen logavgexp=log(avgexp)





gen rej = r(p)
post simuls (b[1,1]) (v[1 ,1]) (e(N)) (rej)
}
else {
post simuls (.) (.) (.) (.)
}
}
postclose simuls
postutil clear
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